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APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION
Louis G. CALDWELL*
Introduction. Appeals from decisions of the Federal Radio
Commission are provided for, and governed by, Section 16 of the
Radio Act of 19271 Because a number of difficult questions turn
on the peculiar language of the section, it is reprinted in full in a
foot note.2  Its very serious defects and its urgent need for thor-
*Of the Chicago Bar, Lecturer on International Law at Northwestern
University Law School. See article by same author, Practice and Procedure
before the Federal Radio Com~inssion, JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, Vol. I, No. 2
(April, 1930), p. 144.
1. Approved Feb. 23, 1927, 44 Sta. 1162. Under the Act the Commission
was to be the licensing authority for a period of one yea? after its first
meeting (which was held Mar. 15, 1927), and thereafter was to be a sort of
an appellate tribunal reviewing actions of the Secretary of Commerce who was
tc be the licensing authority (as he had been under the preceding Radio
Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302). By successive amendments approved Mar. 28,
1928, Mar. 4, 1929, and Dec. 19, 1929, the Commission has been continued as
the licensing authority and under the last amendment it is henceforth to con-
tinue as such "until otherwise provided by law." Under S. J. Res. 176, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess., which has been passed by the Senate and, together with an
amendment substituting a new Sec. 16, has been reported favorably by the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Rep. No. 1633, May
24, 1930), it is possible that by the time this article appears, the power of
radio regulation now reposed in the Secretary of Commerce by the Radio
Act of 1927 will have been transferred to the Commission, and the Radio
Division of the Department will have become a part of the Commission's
organization. No consideration, therefore, will be given in this article to Sec.
5 of the Radio Act of 1927 governing review of decisions of the Secretary of
Commerce by the Commission. See article entitled Practice and Procedure
before the Federal Radio Commission, JOURNAL OF AiR LAW, Vol. I, No. 2(April, 1930), pp. 149-150. For convenience this article is hereinafter cited
as "Radio Prac. & Proc."
2. '"Sec. 16. Any applicant for a construction permit, for a station
license, or for the renewal or modification of an existing station license
whose application is refused by the licensing authority shall have the right to
appeal from said decision to the Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia; and any' licensee whose license is revoked by the commission shall have
the right to appeal from such decision of revocation to said Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia or to the district court of the United States in
which the apparatus licensed is operated, by filing with said court, within
twenty days after the decision complained of is effective, notice in writing of
said appeal and of the reasons therefor.
"The licensing authority from whose decision an appeal is taken shall
be notified of said appeal by service upon it, prior to the filing thereof, of a
certified copy of said appeal and of the reasons therefor. Within twenty days
after the filing of said appeal the licensing authority shall file with the court
the originals or certified copies of all papers and evidence presented to it
upon the original application for a permit or license or in the hearing upon
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oughgoing amendment have been the subject of extended comment
and discussion elsewhere. 3
Briefly, Section 16 provides for appeals to the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia from the following kinds of decisions by
the Federal Radio Commission:
1. Refusals by the Commission to grant any of the
following four kinds of application:
(a) Application for construction permit.
(b) Application for license.
(c) Application for renewal of license.
(d) Application for modification of license.
2. Revocation of license by the Commission.
In the first class of cases, only the denied applicant may appeal;
in the second class, only the licensee whose license is revoked may
appeal. The licensee whose license is revoked may, at his option,
appeal to the district court of the United States in which the ap-
paratus licensed is located.
All told, fifty appeals have been taken from decisions of the
Commission to the Court of Appeals, of which twelve have been
decided in a series of eight opinions,' eighteen are now pending
said order of revocation, and also a like copy of its decision thereon and a
full statement i.n writing of the facts and the grounds for its decision as
found and given by it. Within twenty days after the filing of said statement
by the licensing authority either party may give notice to the court of his
desire to adduce additional evidence. Said notice shall be in the form of a
verified petition stating the nature and character of said additional evidence,
and the court may thereupon order such evidence to be taken in such manner
and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem proper.
"At the earliest convenient time the court shall hear, review, and determine
the appeal upon said record and evidence, and may alter or revise the de-
cision appealed from and enter such judgment as to it may seem just. The
revision by the court shall be confined to the points set forth in the reasons of
appeal."
3. Report of Standing Committee on Radio Law, Amer. Bar Reports,
Vol. 54 (1929), pp. 461-469, 477; Report of Standing Committee on Com-
munications, Am_er. Bar Reports, Vol. 55 (1930), not yet published, Chap. V.
Part 1; Hearing. on S. 6, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (May, 1929), pp. 149-156.
The first mentioned report will be hereinafter referred to as "1929 Radio
Com. Rep."; the second, as "1930 Communications Com. Rep."; the hearings,
as "Hearings on S. 6." Proposals now pending in Congress to remedy the
defects in Sec. 16 are described and discussed in 1930 Communications Com.
Rep., Chap. V.
4. General Electric Company v. Commission, 31 F. (2d) 630, involving
three appeals from one decision of the Commission, two by the General Elec-
tric Company and one by the State of New York, Richmond Development
Corportion v. Commission, 35 F. (2d) 883; Technical Radio Laboratory v.
Commission, 36 F. (2d) 111; City of New York v. Commission, 36 F. (2d)
115; Carrell v. Commission, 36 F. (2d) 117; Great Lakes Broadcasting Con-
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before the Court, and twenty have been voluntarily or involuntarily
dismissed.
5
Administrative Function of Reviewing Court. By its recent
decision in Federal Radio Conmission v. General Electric Company,'
the Supreme Court of the United States held that in reviewing
decisions of the Commission the Court of Appeals exercises ad-
ministrative and not judicial functions, and dismissed a writ of
certiorari previously granted.7  The opinion, written by Mr. Justice
Van Devanter, after summarizing the statute, states in part:
"We think it plain from this resume of the pertinent parts of the
act that the powers confided to the commission respecting the granting
and renewal of station licenses are purely administrative and that the
provision for appeals to the Court of Appeals does no more than make
that court a superior and revising agency in the same field. The court's
province under that provision is essentially the same as its province
under the legislation which up to a recent date permitted appeals to it
from administrative decisions of the Commissioner of Patents. Indeed,
the provision in the Act of 1927 is patterned largely after that legisla-
tion. And while a few differences are found, there is none that is ma-
terial here."
After a review of the authorities,8 and after distinguishing statutes
pany, Voliva, and Agricultural Broadcasting Company v. Commission, 37 F.(2d) 993; Chicago Federation of Labor v. Commission, not yet reported, U. S.
Daily, May 9, 1930; Universal Service Wireless, Inc. v. Commission, not yet
reported, U. S. Daily, May 8, 1930. The style in which the cases are entitled
is not entirely appropriate, since it suggests that the proceedings are in the
nature of the statutory remedies which have been created for judicial review
of decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission. A more appropriate style would be "In re Application of John
Doe." See 1929 Radio Com. Rep., p. 462, footnote 5.
5. A list of these cases will be found in 1929 Radio Com. Rep., pp. 462-
467, footnotes 4, 5, 17 and 21, and in 1930 Communications 'Com. Rep., Chap.
III, part 5, footnotes 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11. Five new appeals have been taken
since the above was written.
6. May 19, 1930, No. 122, Adv. Ops., 1929-1930, p. 514, U. S.
Daily, May 20, 1930. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported as
General Electric Company v. Federal Radio Commission, 31 F. (2d) 630. A
petition for certiorari by the City of New York with respect to the decision
reported as City of New York v. Commission, 36 F. (2d) 115 was denied on
March 12, 1930, Adv. Ops., 1929-1930, p. 356. Another petition for certiorari
by Agricultural Broadcasting Company with respect to Great Lakes Broad-
casting Co., et al. v. Commission, 37 F. (2d) 993, was denied on June 3, 1930
(U. S. Daily, May 26, June 4, 1930), Adv. Ops., 1929-1930, p. 653.
7. Petition granted Oct. 14, 1929, Adv Ops., 1929-1930, pp. 22, 346.
Petition for mandamus and/or prohibition set down for hearing, ibid. p. 22,
and later voluntarily withdrawn, U. S. Daily, Jan. 8, 1930.
8. Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, 60; Postum Cereal Company v.
California Fig Nut Company, 272 U. S. 693, 700-701; Keller v. Potomac
Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 442-444; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Crannis,
273 U. S. 70, 74; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U. S.274,
289; Ex paite Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 449; Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 711. 724-727.
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governing appeals from other commissions,9 the opinion concludes:
"Of course the action of the Court of Appeals in assessing the
costs against the commission did not alter the nature of the proceeding.
"Our conclusion is that the proceeding in that court was not a case
or controversy, in the sense of the judiciary article, but was an admin-
istrative proceeding, and therefore that the decision therein is not re-
viewable by this Court."
The facts of the case need not be here reviewed further than to state
that the decision of the Commission appealed from was a denial of
an application for renewal of license for Station WGY at Schenec-
tady, N. Y., consisting in a reduction in hours of operation for
the ensuing license period beginning November 11. 1928.1' The
judgment of the Court of Appeals required the Commission to issue
the renewal license applied for, and assessed costs against the Com-
mission. It was the contention of the Commission before the Su-
preme Court, inter alia, that in rendering the judgment the Court
of Appeals had, as a matter of fact, exercised judicial functions,
e. g., by entering judgment for costs,1°a by passing on the consti-
tutionality of the Radio Act of 1927, by entering a stay order against
the Commission,lb and by entering judgment holding certain of
the Commission's regulations invalid by necessary implication.100
The Commission also contended that, since the provision for appeal
to the district courts of the United States is valid only if the review-
ing court is confined to questions of law, the provision for appeal
to the Court of Appeals should be construed so as to save the sec-
tion from partial invalidity. The opinion of the Supreme Court
is not as clear as might be desired with regard to the issues thus
raised. In providing for appeals from decisions of a tribunal such
as the Federal Radio Commission (which manifestly is an adminis-
trative and not a judicial body), Congress had not merely two,
but three, alternatives in fixing the character of the function to be
reposed in the Court of Appeals (which, under the decisions, is
9. Statutes governing appeals from the Commissioner of, Patents and
from the Board of Tax Appeals, and suits to enforce or set aside orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission and orders of the Federal Trade Com-
mission.
10. See Rado Prac. & Proc., pp. 154-155; 1929 Radio Com. Rep., pp. 464-465. 10a. Tesla Electric Co. v. Scott, 101 Fed. 524.
10b. In re McFarland, 30 App. D. C. 365, 390.
10c. U. S. ex rel. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U. S. 543; U. S. v. Antikamnia
Chemical Co., 231 U. S. 654, that' regulations of the Commission have the
force of law, see U. S. V. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677; U. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U. S.
506; Maryland Casualty Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 342; Daeuffer-Lieborman Brg.
Co., Inc., v. U. S., 36 F. (2d) 568.
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manifestly a legislative and not a constitutional court): (1) the
function might be purely judicial, as it is in the case of appeals
from decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals, or in suits to enforce
or set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission or the
Federal Trade Commission; or (2) the function might be purely
administrative, as it is in the case of appeals from decisions of the
Commissioner of Patents; or (3) the function might be both judi-
cial and administrative, as it seems to be in the case of decisions of
the Court of Claims and of the Board of Tax Appeals2' In the
General Electric Company case the Supreme Court has excluded
the first of the foregoing alternatives, and to this extent, in the
light of its previous decisions, the decision seems unassailable. The
language of the opinion seems to indicate that Section 16 comes
within the second alternative, although there is nothing specifically
excluding the third. If Section 16 comes within the second alter-
native, and the Court of Appeals, with administrative power only,
improperly exercises judicial functions, why should not the Su-
preme Court have power to review the exercise of such judicial
functions (on the same theory and to the same extent that it now
reviews judgments of the district courts of the United States entered
without jurisdiction)? The question is directly raised by the judg-
ment for costs which the Court of Appeals entered against the Com-
mission, with regard to which the Supreme Court says merely that
"this action . did not alter the nature of the proceeding."
If Section 16 comes within the third alternative, why may not the
Supreme Court review the judicial actions of the Court of Appeals?
It may be that the nature of the proceeding definitely determines
these questions, but the reasoning which leads to such a conclusion
would be of great assistance in drafting the much-needed amend-
ments to Section 16.
Since the door is closed to review by the Supreme Court,
anomalous situations are presented. If the Court of Appeals renders
a decision without jurisdiction (e. g., on an appeal not filed within
the prescribed statutory period), or in excess of its jurisdiction
(e. g., affecting a person not legally before it), or erroneous as a
matter of law (e. g., an erroneous construction of the standard of
"public interest, convenience, or necessity"), a person injured by
such a decision obviously must proceed on the theory that the de-
ll. Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438 and cases reviewed
therein. See statute governing certification to Supreme Court of questions
of law by Court of Claims, and certiorari by Supreme Court to Court of
Claims, 43 Stat. 939; U. S. Code, Title 28, Sec. 288.
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cision is void and subject to collateral attack, if he is to enforce
recognition of his rights. Although he may occasionally be able to
get relief b. appropriate proceedings directed against the person
favored by such a decision, in the usual case he must proceed against
the Commission by suit for injunction or mandamus in the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia.12 Curiously, on appeal he will
find himself before the very court whose decision he is attacking.
Validity of Section (16.-Retiew by District Courts of the
United States. The language of Section 16 with regard to appellate
procedure, the taking of evidence, and the scope of the reviewing
court's power is the same with respect both to the Court of Appeals
and to the district courts of the United States. Under the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court, and the authorities it relies upon, the
provision for appeals to the district courts is unconstitutional, since
such courts are constitutional courts and may not be invested with
administrative functions."3 The act of revoking a license is usually
considered no less administrative in character than the act of grant-
ing a license, at least where the existence of grounds for revocation
depends on issues of fact confided in the first instance to adminis-
trative discretion.14  The constitutionality of the provision is now
under attack.'"
12. The possibility that suit for injunction or mandamus might be main-
tained in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the members
of the Court of Appeals, although apparently a logical method of attack if
the latter Court sits as a purely administrative tribunal, seems as a practical
matter rather a remote one. Suits for mandamus and/or prohibition in the
Supreme Court of the United States against the Court of Appeals seem to
be foreclosed by statutory restrictions which have been held to confine the
employment of the writs to cases where they are ancillary to the Supreme
Court's original or appellate jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
176; In re Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 482, 488. In the writer's opinion, the
possibilities of the use of the writ of prohibition in such a case, however,
have not been sufficiently explored, although it is extremely probable that the
Supreme Court would hold that the writ does not lie. See Ex parte Bakelite
Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 448.
13. See cases cited in footnote 8, supra, and Ma-King Products Co. v.
Blair, 271 U. S. 449.
14. Blair v. Graupner, 29 F. (2d) 815, 816; Burns v. Doran, 37 F. (2d)
484. Note that under Sec. 15 of the Radio Act, power is given to the district
courts to revoke radio licenses as part of the penalty for violation of anti-
trust laws, etc.
15. In General Broadcasting System, Inc., v. Bridgeport Broadcasting
Station, Inc., a suit now pending in the U. S. District Court in Connecticut.
This extraordinary case is discussed in more detail later on. The validity
of the provision has been frequently questioned. See comment on Radio Act
of 1927 in Amer. Bar. Assn. Jour. (June-July, 1927), Vol. 13, pp. 343, 368.
If the provision is unconstitutional and, acting under it, a district court
nevertheless takes jurisdiction over an appeal from a decision of the Com-
mission, may the question of constitutionality be raised on appeal from the
district court to the circuit court of appeals and ultimately to the Supreme
Court, or should the question be raised only in some extraordinary proceed-
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Validity of Section 16.-Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals uith
respect to persons other than appellants. Whether Section 16 is
to be construed to give the Court of Appeals power to render a
judgment adversely affecting any person other than the immediate
parties, i. e., the appellant and the Commission, is discussed under
another sub-heading. If it be construed to give the Court such
power, then its validity is questioned in cases now pending before
that Court1 and elsewhere.' The contentions made are (1) that
persons holding licenses or constructiori permits from the Com-
mission, or who have been found by the Commission to be entitled
to licenses or construction permits, have rights which are protected
by the Fifth Amendment against deprivation without due process of
law,'" and (2) that a statute purporting to confer upon a court or
administrative tribunal' power to deprive persons of such rights
without notice and hearing is invalid for want of due process,19 it
being necessary that the statute itself provide for notice and hear-
ing in order to meet the requirements of the Constitution.2  The
writer refrains from expressing any opinion as to the correctness
of these contentions.
Appealable Decisions: In General. It is possible to discern a
slight modification of the attitude of the Court of Appeals in its
construction of Section 16 with respect to what constitute appeal-
able decisions of the Commission. In its first decision under the
ing instituted for the purpose? Under the Supreme Court's decision, "the
nature of the proceeding would.seem to be determinative against the right to
take, such an appeal."
16. In the group of cases generally known and hereinafter referred to as
the Short Wave Appeals (Intercity Radio Telegraph Company v. Commission,
No. 4987; Wireless Telegraph & Communications Company v. Commission,
JNo. 4988; R. C. A. Communications, Inc. v. Commission, No. 4990; Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Company v. omnission, No. 4991).
17. Apparently the question is, or may be, involved in Bridgeport Broad-
casting Station, Inc. v. Commission (D. C., D. Conn.).
18. Garfield v. United States, et rel. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249; United States
v. Wildcat, 244 U. S. 11; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515;
Kemohah v. Shaffer Oil & Refining Co., 38 F. (2d) 665.
19. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S.
409; Postal Telegraph-Cable Company v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88; Parsons v. District
of Columbia 170 U. S. 45; Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371; Railroad Com-
mission Cases, 116 U. S. 307; Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134
U. S. 418; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 216 U. S. 538; Bratton v. Chandler,
26a1 U. S. 110; Goldsmith v. U. S. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117;
Wilkinson v. Dougherty (C. A., D. C.), 24 F. (2d) 1007.
20. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413 and cases therein
cited; Coffey v. Noel (D. C., W. Va.), 11 F. (2d) 399.
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section, General Electric Company v. Commission,21 it held that a
decision of the Commission purporting to grant an application for
renewal of license by issuing a license with reduced hours of opera-
tion, is in reality a denial of the application. This is a liberal, but
a sensible, interpretation of the statute. In its second decision,
Richmond Development Corporation v. Commission,22 the Court
reversed a decision of the Commission denying an application for an
extension of time for the completion of a station, a permit for which
had been previously granted and twice extended, and the applica-
tion for the third extension of which had been filed fifteen days
after the expiration of the second extension. To entertain such an
appeal, the Court necessarily had to hold that an application for
extension comes within one of the four classes of applications spe-
cified in Section 16; in other words, that it is an application for a
construction permit, or (a more remote possibility) an application
for modification of licenser.2  This decision seemed to forecast a
very liberal construction of Section 16. There is occasion for differ-
ence of opinion as to its correctness. 24
In Universal Service Wireless, Inc. v. Commission,24a the Court
of Appeals rendered its first (and, so far, its only) holding that a
case was not appealable under the statute. The facts of the case,
for the purpose of the point under discussion, were as follows:
Appellant, together with ten other corporations of a similar nature,
had filed applications for construction permits with the Commission
covering the eventual use of domestic high frequency channels. By
action taken December 22, 1928, the Commission "granted" the ap-
lications. 25  Construction permits were never issued, however, the
chief reason being that appellant itself insisted that the Commission
withhold issuances pending the settling of differences which had
arisen between appellant and the other corporations, appellant being
dissatisfied with the number of channels allotted to it as between
it and the other, corporations. No agreement ever having been
21. 31 F. (2d) 630.
22. 35 F. (2d) 883.
23. By motion to dismiss and again in its brief and on oral argument
the Commission urged that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal but the Court did not pass on the point.
24. See the writer's comment on the case in Recent Decisions under the
Radio Act of 1927, Amer. Bar Assn. Jour. (Jan. 1930), Vol. 16, p. 19.
24a. Not yet reported, U. S. Daily, May 8, 1930.
25. These were part of what have been generally known as the press
applications. This particular group of applications asked for 25 channels,
and the Commission's records show that by its action of Dec. 22, 1928, it
intended to allocate only 20 channels to the group of corporations, the latter
to agree among themselves as to the repartition of the channels among
themselves.
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
reached among the parties, the Commission took action on June 20,
1929," 0 disposing of the channels in question in a manner inconsistent
with its action of December 22. 1928, and finding that its action
of December 22, 1928, was "not effective." Appellant, relying in
part upon the Richmond Development Corporation case, contended
before the Court of Appeals that the Commission's action was in
substance a denial of its applications for construction permits. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, saying inter alia:
"It is conceded by counsel for appellant that this appeal is not
taken from, an order denying appellant an application for a license, but
is based upon the theory that 'the Commission, by its order of June 20,
1929, attempted to nullify its order of December 22, 1928, and to take
away from and deprive appellant of the rights acquired by it under
said order.' The weakness of this position consists in the fact that
appellant never accepted any rights under the order of December 22,
but contested the order consistently and persistently, and on June 5,
1929, announced its refusal to accept any benefits under the order of
December 22nd. It, therefore, was not such a party to the order of
June 20, 1929, as to give it, under the statute, the right of appeal. Nor
can appellant relate his appealable right back to the order of December
22, since the Court is without jurisdiction in that an appeal from that
order was not noted within time, consequently, there seems to be no
ground upon which the right of appeal can be upheld in this case.
"The right of appeal being a statutory one, the Court cannot dis-
pense with its express provisions, even to the extent of doing equity.
Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 12 How. 387; Carlin v. Goldberg, 45 App. D. C.
540."27
By implication the decision seems to hold that revocation or cancel-
lation of a construction permit (or, at least, an order setting aside
a previous order granting an application for construction permit)
is not a revocation of license under Section 14. In view of the
language of Section 21, which seems to make the issuance of a
26. This order was the final step in the press allocations and contemplated
the formation of a single corjporation to serve all press interests. Such a
corporation was formed (Press Wireless, Inc.), and is now endeavoring to
protect the press allocations in the Short Wave Appeals.
27. See also the following cases cited in the Commission's briefs in
support of a strict construction of the statute: Minneapolis and St. Louis
R. R. Co. v. Board of Railroad Commniss'oners, 44 Minn. 336, 46 N. W. 559;
New England R. R. Co. v. Hyde, 101 Fed. 400; Noland v. Moore, 81 Fla. 598,
88 So. 601; Prudential Casualty Co. v. State, 143 N. E. 631, 194 Ind. 542;
Hague v. Wateree Power Co., 112 S. E. 55, 119 S. C. 319; Cf. I. C. C. v. Union
Pacific R. R., 222 U. , 541; U. S. v. Curry, 6. How 106. See also U. S. v.
Young, 94 U. S. 259, 24 L. Ed. 153; Ex parte Vallendigham, 1 Wall. 251;
Carroll v. Dorsey, 20 How. 207: Smith v. Currier, 230 Fed. 805; McDaniell v.
Strand, 105 Fed. 488; City of Waxahachie v. Caler, 92 Fed. 285; Wholesale
Grocers' Assn. of El Paso, Texas v. Federal Trade Commission, 277 Fed. 657;
Cosper v. God, 34 App. D. C. 194; Re Fullager, 32 App. D. C. 22 2.; see
Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U. S. 162.
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license mandatory on the Commission ,when the grantee of a con-
struction permit has fulfilled the conditions of the permit (unless
some new cause or circumstance is shown to have arisen)," and
in view of the fact that in several sections of the Act no mention
is made of construction permits where logic requires that they be
mentioned along with licenses, 9 it was possible to contend that the
word "license" in Section 14 should be construed to include both
license and construction permit, and that a decision revoking or
cancelling a construction permit is an appealable order. This point
does not seem to have been made by appellant, but since no con-
struction permit had actually been issued to appellant, such a con-
tention would probably not have been upheld.
Appealable Decisions: Denials of Applications. What consti-
tutes the denial of an application so as to constitute an appealable
decision? This question resembles, in most (but not all) respects,
the question as to when the Commission must accord notice and
hearing under Section 11.'0 Under the decisions date, only two
propositions can be regarded as definitely settled.
First, it is not necessary that there be a denial of the applica-
tion in to to. Construction permits and licenses are to be considered
as consisting of a large number of essential features, 81 and an ap-
plication for a permit (or license, or renewal of license, or modifica-
tion of license) having certain terms and conditions is not to be
considered granted by the issuance of an instrument having terms
and conditions other than those applied for. This is clear from
the decision in the General Electric Company case, where a renewal
license authorized reduced hours of operation, and from a dictum in
White. v. FederaA Radio Connmissi&on,82 where a renewal license
authorized reduced power. A number of cases now pending involve
changes of frequency in renewal licenses imposed on stations by
28. Radio Prac. & Proc., pp. 176-177. The Commission has, at times,
taken the opposite position. See, for example, its statement filed with the
Court of Appeals in WMAK Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Commission, No.
5117, U. S. Daily, Dec. 23, 1929, Jan. 10, 1930.
29. Radio Prac. & Proc., p. 160. See, for example, Sec. 5 (A) and (B),9, 11, 12, 14 and 15. The omission to mention construction permits in these
sections was probably an oversight due to the fact that the requirement of
construction permits (Sec. 21) was added to the bill at a comparatively
late date.
30. Radio Prac. & Proc., pp. 163-168, 172-179.
31. Ibid., p. 172.
32. 29 F. (2d). 113.
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the Commission without notice or hearing."s Another case involves
the right of the Commission to insert in a renewal license a condi-
tion not contained in the previous license, the condition being to
the effect that if a proper applicant applied for appellant's channel
for use in another specified zone, appellant's license would not be
again renewed. 4 Another case involves the right of the Commission
to accord, by a renewal license, reduced service area to appellant's
station, by reason of the assignment of other stations to the same
frequency at an insufficient geographical separation and by increas-
ing the power of another station previously operating on that fre-
quency. s6 Whether such cases come within the doctrine of the
General Electric Company case must await the Court's decisions.
Secondly, it is not necessary, to furnish the basis of an appeal,
that the Commission's decision be rendered after notice and hear-
ing underl Section 11. The appeal may be taken regardless of
whether a hearing has been held, s" and, presumably, regardless of
whether a hearing is required to be held under Section 11.8" The
denial appealed from may result from action of the Commission
pursuant to a general regulation, such as a new allocation or a
general order establishing the basis for such an allocation."8
In addition, it is possible to forecast, with a fair degree of
assurance, the eventual construction of Section 16 in a few other
respects. Applications for the Commission's written consent to
33. Among these are The Courier-Journal Company and The Louisville
Times Company v. Commission, No. 5190 (U. S. Daily, April 22, 29, 1930),
and Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Commission, No. 5192 (U.
S. Daily, April 25, 29, 1930). Other appeals raising the same point have been
taken but were voluntarily dismissed at an early stage of the appeal as the
result of a- settlement of differences with the Commission. See Triangle
Broadcasters v. Commission, No.' 5092; Victor C. Carlson v. Commission,
No. 5093, and Fred C. Schoenwolf v. Commission, No. 5094 (U. S. Daily,
Nov. 12, Dec. 2, 1929). See also Isle of Dreams Broadcasting Co. v. Com-
mission (U. S. Daily, Nov. 9, 1929).
34. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Commission, Nos.:
5104, 5105 and 5150 (U. S. Daily, Nov. 20, 1929).
35. The Journal Company v. Commission, No. 5095 (U. S. Daily, Nov.
12, 1929). The same question is presented by suits for injunction now pend-
ing against the Commission, discussed under a later sub-heading,
36. General Electric Company case, supra.
37. It is not yet clear whether a hearing must be held under Sections
11 and 21 on applications for construction permit. See Radio Prac. & Proc.,
pp. 176-177. Nor is it clear whether hearings must be held under Sec. 11 on
applications which do not present the issue of "public interest, convenience or
necessity," e. g., an application which on its face cannot be granted because
of conflict with the provisions of the law (such.i as Secs. 12 or 13) or with
regulations of the Commission. See ibid., pp. 166-168.
38. General Electric Company case, supra. A similar situation appears
to be presented in the Courier-Journal Company, case, No. 5190, and the
Westinghouse case, No. 5192, supra.
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assignment of license under the second paragraph of Section 12
will probably be considered applications for modification of license.89
The same may also be held with respect to applications to install
automatic frequency control or increased modulation,"0 applications
for special authorization to engage in television and picture broad-
casting in the broadcast band by existing broadcasting stations, and
other miscellaneous applications of a similar nature." ' Under the
Richmond Development Corporation case,"2 applications for exten-
sion of date of completion and possibly also applications for other
modification of construction permit, will be considered as applications
for construction permit.
Other than the foregoing, the law is in a confused and unsatis-
factory state, due primarily to the failure of Congress to establish
a procedure which would accommodate itself to the peculiar situa-
tions which arise if the licensing of radio stations is to be made a
quasi-judicial matter.
Consider, first, the practice followed by the Commission in deal-
ing with applications for broadcasting privileges in the broadcast
band, where, under the regulations of the Commission now in force,'
8
there are a total of ninety channels available for use by broadcasting
stations in the United States. On these ninety channels there is
already a chaotic congestion of 615 stations," and the Commission
from time toi time authorizes the construction of new stations.
Whenever an application is made proposing to establish a new broad-
casting station, or whenever an existing station applies for an im-
proved assignment (a better channel, more power, increased hours
of operation, etc.), the applicant is required to designate the fre-
quency of the channel desired, and the Commission, if it designates
the application for hearing,'5 notifies all existing stations on that and
39. Radio Prac. & Proc., p. 159. It is not clear, however, what will be
held with regard to applications for the Commission's approval of assignment
of construction per:mit under Sec. 21.
40. The Commission is now applying the clumsy provisions of Sec. 21
to such. situations and is requiring a construction permit for such situations,
with much unnecessary hardship and annoyance to broadcasters. An applica-
tion for modification should be sufficient to cover such changes.
41. See Commission's 3rd Ann. Rep., pp. 67-68.
42. 35 F. (2d) 883.
43. See General Order 40 of Aug. 30, 1928, 2nd Ann. Rep.,. pp. 48-49.
44. See Radio Prac. & Proc., pp. 145-146.
45. All too frequently, however, the Commission has granted such an
application, particularly on regional and local channels (and also daytime or
limited time positions on. cleared channels), without giving notice or hearing
to stations already assigned to such channels. In some cases, particularly in
cases of existing stations clamoring for better assignments without filing
applications for any specific channel, the Commission has given such stations
improved assignments without any application therefor before it. and thus
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on neighboring channels, which would be adversely affected by
granting the application. This procedure, which seemed to have
been held not legitimate in the General Electric Company case, was
expressly upheld and approved in later decisions.
In Chicago Federation of Labor v. Commission," the Court
of Appeals said:
"The appellant complains of the procedure adopted by the Com-
mission in hearing its application. It is assigned as error that the Com-
mission required appellant to designate a single frequency in its applica-
tion for modification of its license, whereby the proceeding was vir-
tually converted into a contest with stations WBBM and KFAB as to
.the use of that frequency.
"In our opinion this procedure was not erroneous. Under Section
4 (f) of the Radio Act of 1927, the Commission is authorized to make
such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may deem necessary
to prevent interference between stations and to carry out the provisions
of the Act.47 It is necessary that when a broadcasting station applies
for the assignment of some other frequency to take the place of that
already allotted to it, the station shall first determine what frequency
it desires to apply for, and shall specify it in its application, in order'
that the Commission may be advised of the exact force and effect of the
application. The number of available broadcasting frequencies is lim-
ited, and they are so interrelated that none can be considered wholly
without reference to others. It is necessary in the interests of justice
that if new allotments are to be considered which may substantially
affect those already granted to other stations, the latter should be noti-
fied and be permitted to intervene in the proceeding. The record in the
present case exemplifies this statement." 4
has itself disregarded the very requirement it usually imposes on applicants,
i. e., that of specifying the channel requested. In order to accommodate such
stations, the Commission has several times made shifts of a dozen or more
other stations without notice or hearing and without any application for it.
See the discussion in connection with. "reallocations" below.
46. Not yet reported, U. S. Daily, May 9, 1930.
47. In support of the conclusion, which is manifestly sound, may also be-
cited Secs. 10 and 21 which virtually require an applicant for license or con-
struction permit to specify the frequency, power and hours of operation
desired, and Sec. 11 which provides that the Commission "shall afford such
applicant an opportunity to be heard under such rules and regulations as it
may prescribe."
48. Appellant (WCFL, the Labor Station in Chicago), operating on a
daytime assignment on 970 kc., 5th Zone cleared channel, had applied for full
time on 770 kc., a 4th Zone cleared channel on which WBBM of Chicago and
KFAB of Lincoln, Neb., were dividing time, and an extensive hearing was
held by the Commission on the application. Later, having denied the applica-
tion and while the appeal was pending, the Commission suddenly, and without
notice or hearing to any of the. stations concerned, shifted a dozen or more
stations so as to give WCFL full time on 1280 kc., a regional channel, U. S.
Daily, Nov. 4, 11, 1929. This was the occasion for immediate appeals by
three of the stations affected. See footnote 33, supra. Within 30 days,
because of mutual interference between WCFL and a station at Chat-
tanooga, Tenn., WCFL was asking to be restored to its former assignment.
U. S. Daily, Dec. 19, 1929. Thereafter, by arrangement with a Seattle sta-
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By implication the procedure was previously approved by the Court
in other cases.4
9
Under. Section 5 of the Amendatory Act of March 28, 1928,
and Section 3 of the Amendatory Act of March 4, 1929, the Com-
mission has been prohibited from issuing broadcasting licenses for a
period of over three months and from issuing licenses for other
kinds of stations for a period of over one year." It has been cus-
tomary for all broadcasting station licenses to run concurrently, with
common expiration dates. This, of course, is not necessary under
the Act, and is not the practice, with regard to other kinds of radio
stations. It is only infrequently that the Commission has made
changes in a station's assignment during a license period; the changes
have usually been ordered to take effect at the common expiration
date of the licenses.51 This has been possible because of the short
license period (and has kept broadcasters in a state of turmoil ever
since the Commission was first established).
Having the Commission's procedure in mind, let us examine
a few of the difficult situations which arise with reference to the
right of appeal. Take first the case where Station A, either as the
result of the application of Station B and hearing thereon, or ar-
bitrarily without application by another and without notice or hear-
ing, is subjected to a modification of license during its license period.
This clearly is not a denial of any conceivable application by Sta-
tion A. In the writer's opinion it may be considered, however, as a
revocation of license and therefore appealable.52
Next take the case where, as the result of an application by
Station B) for Station A's frequency and a hearing in which both
stations participate, Station B's application is granted and, at the
end of the license period a license is issued to Station B for the fre-
quency in question and a license is issued to Station A for a less
desirable frequency. The action of the Commission has a double
tion assigned regularly to 970 kc., the Commission (the appeal still pending)
authorized WCFL to operate daily until 2 hours .after sunset on the Pacific
Coast. WCFL is now e ndeavoring to have Congress adopt a joint resolution
requiring the Commission to provide three cleared channels for the exclusive
use of labor, agriculture, and the Department of Intrior, respectively.
49. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Commission, 37 F. (2d) 993, 995;
City of New York v. Commission, 36- F. (2d) 115, 117.
50. This limitation expires on December 31, 1930, and the three and
five-year limitations originally prescribed by Sec. 9 will be restored into
force, unless the Act is again amended.
51. An important exception to this has been in cases where without dis-
turbing the assignments of existing stations, a new station has been assigned
to a regional or local channel or to a daytime position on a cleared channel
52. See next sub-heading.
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
complexion: it is in form a granting of Station B's application, and
in substance also a denial of Station A's application for renewal
of license. But the hearing was not held on Station A's application
for renewal, which need not be filed until thirty days before the
beginning of the next license period,"2a and may not (and usually
is not) on file when the hearing is held and the decision made. No
evidence has, therefore, been heard in support of or opposing Sta-
tion A's application for renewal, and, therefore, if Section 16 be
strictly interpretated, the evidence heard with reference to Station
B's application has no place in the record transmitted to the Court
by the Commission" if Station A appeals from a denial of its renewal
application at the end of the license period. Such a situation might
have arisen in either the Chicago Federation of Labor case or the
City of New York case,5" if the applications for modification had
been granted instead of being denied.
An interesting variation on the foregoing is furnished by the
case of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Commission.55 WLS and
WENR, two Chicago stations, were dividing time on 870 kc., a
Fourth Zone cleared channel, WLS having 5/7 of the time and
WENR having 2/7 of the time.16 WENR applied for modification
of its license to increase its hours of operation from 2/7 to full
time, or to at least half time. More as a measure of protection than
otherwise, WLS applied for modification to increase its hours of
operation to full time. To further complicate matters, WCBD, of
Zion City, Illinois, applied for, time on the channel. The three
applicationo were heard together by the Commission and, by a
divided Commission, all three were denied. All three applicants ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission in its denial
of WCBD's application but reversed the Commission otherwise by
52a. See -n.eral Order 89, U. S. Daily, April 22, 1930.
53. In such a situation it is, of course, possible for the Commission to
see to it that the hearing is held with reference to Station A's application for
renewal as well as Station B's application for modification.
54. 36 F. (2d) 115. The same situation is presented in WMAK Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Commission, No. 5117, and Onandaga Company v.
Commission, No. 5125. The situatiof also arose in Northwst Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Commission, No. 5112, but the appeal was voluntarily dismissed
under a settlement by which the Commission agreed to hold another hearing,
which will be held in Seattle on July 10, 1930.
55. 37 F. (2d) 993.
56. This was under the allocation of Nov. 11, 1928. Prior to that date,
WLS had dividedtime with WCBD on that channel and WENR had had full
time (but less power) on another channel, The case really arose out of the
allocation of Nov. 11, 1928; the stations, however, followed the procedure laid
down by the Commission instead of ignoring it, as did WGY in the General
Electric Company case.
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awarding WENR half time at the expense of WLS. On appeal
WLS contended earnestly that the three appeals must be considered
separately and that, on an appeal by WENR, nothing could be taken
from WLS which was not a party to that appeal. The Court, how-
ever, viewed the three applications as representing
''competitive claims of the three appellant broadcasting stations for
operating time on the same broadcasting channel."
without passing on the specific point raised by WLS. What would
have happened if WLS had not appealed and subjected itself to the
Court's jurisdiction, is not clear. Nor is it clear what kind of a
decision would have been the basis for appeal if the Commission had
granted the application of any one of the three applicants, with
consequent injury to one or both of the other applicants.6"
Consider next the situation presented by what are known as the
Short Wave Appeals. 8 In the fall of 1928, there were open for
assignment a limited number of domestic high frequency channels 9
for point-to-point wireless telegraphy, and applications were pending
before the Commission involving many times the total available. The
exact number of channels available, although known approximately,
could not be known exactly because of the fact that negotiations
were pending between the United States, Canada and other North
Ameiican nations, for an allocation of these channels among them;
for the same reason, the exact frequencies which would be ultimately
available to the United States could not be known. The Commission
held hearings on the applications during the fall of 1928. On De-
cember 22, 1928, it granted applications for construction permits"0
to two of the applicants covering all but a few of the available chan-
nels, leaving only sufficient to constitute a safe. margin for the pend-
ing international negotiations; in actual figures, including about six
channels which were already in use, it thus disposed of about 66 chan-
nels, but did not specify the channels by frequency. The North Amer-
ican Agreement8' was thereafter concluded and became effective on
March 1, 1929. It developed that under this agreement there remained
57. See footnote 6, supra.
58. See footnote 16, suPra.
59. In the band 1500-6000 kc. See 1929 Radio Com. Rep., pp. 411-436 for
an exposition of the scientific factors involved.
60. In order to avoid unnecessary complication, the above account is
simplified by omitting mention of other considerations which are raised in the
cases. The Commission's Statement of Grounds on the Short Wave Appeals
is available at the Govt. Pr. Off., as Intercity Radio Telegraph Co. v. Com-
mission, and contains a comprehensive review of the facts involv.ed in the
cases, as wt.l as an informative series of documents attached as exhibits.
61. Govt. Pr. Off. Treaty Series, No. '77-A. 
_
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only 22 channels to be disposed of, a number which was insufficient
to meet the demands incorporated in the applications of any one of
three important applicants, not to mention all three of them together
or the many other less important applicants. The Commission held
further hearings on the applications of these three applicants 2 (as
well as certain others), and on June 7-10, 1929, granted to one of
them construction permits covering virtually all the remaining chan-
nels (which were considerably less than the number the applicant
applied for), and denied all the applications of the other two. At
about the same time it made public the precise frequencies constitut-
ing forty of the channels covered by its action of December 22,
1928, and on June 20, 1929, it made public the other twenty. As a
result of the Commission's actions all but one of the total number
of available channels were disposed of. All three of the applicants
(including the one part of whose applications were granted) ap-
pealed, and, as part of their complaint at the denial of their applica-
tions, attacked to a greater or less degree, the Commission's actions
of December 22, 1928, and June, 1929, granting the applications
of others. Thus, the cases raise such questions as (1) whether,
under the foregoing facts, the Commission's action of December 22,
1928, constituted a denial of appellants' applications (for, if so, then
an appeal should have been noted within twenty days thereafter),
and (2) whether the Commission's actions in.June, 1929, granting
or otherwise acting on the applications of others may be considered
as refusals of appellants' applications, or in connection with appeals
from the formal refusals of appellants' applications. The writer
refrains from expressing any opinion on these questions, and men-
tions them only as eloquent illustrations of the inadequacy of Sec-
tion 16. Analogous situations constantly occur in the broadcast band
where, with several applications pending for assignment to the same
channel, one of the applications is heard and granted, or a station
which has filed no such application is, without notice or hearing,
assigned to the channel which the applicants are seeking.
Consider, thirdly, the situation where, on an application for re-
newal which has been designated for hearing, the Commission fails
or refuses to hold a hearing until after the expiration of the existing
license, and, refuses to grant the station any temporary authorization
to operate in the interim. This action, which seems arbitrary and
62. Because of their tentative merger, Intercity Radio Telegraph Com-
pany' apd Wireless Telegraph & Communications Company are spoken of as
one applicant.
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unduly harsh, has been taken from time to time recently.6 May
the application for renewal be considered as having been denied at
the expiration of the license period?
Consider, fourthly, the case where, instead of granting a re-
newal application duly filed, the Commission "extends" the exist-
ing license for a temporary period for one reason or another, some-
times as a disciplinary measure in the nature of a period of proba-
tion.6sa No specific authority is given by the Radio Act to "extend"
licenses as distinguished from renewing them, but extensions have
been virtually an administrative necessity because of the short li-
cense period.. Is such an extension to be considered as a denial
of the application for renewal? The extension, particularly when for
a short period (e. g., 30 days) is not a renewal of a three months
license. If, in addition, the extension places the licensee under pro-
bation, it contains conditions not contained in the license sought to
be renewed.
Appealable Decisions: Revocations of License. There have been
no out-and-out revocations of license by the Commission, because
of difficulties created by the short license period. Disciplinary action
has usually been administered in connection with renewal applica-
tions.68b
One problem which may arise is in case the Commission sus-
pends a license. Section 14 gives power to revoke for causes spe-
cified in the section, after notice and hearing, the revocation not to
become effective until the conclusion of the hearing. In isolated
cases the Commission has suspended licenses without notice or hear-
ing. The law is not clear as to whether the power to revoke im-
plies the lesser power to suspend (the writer is inclined to think
63. It was taken with regard to WCHI of Chicago at the end of the
license period expiring April 30,1930. It seems likely to occur frequently in
the future if the Commission attempts to give effect to its General Order 89,
which requires renewal applications to be filed 30 days or more prior to the
expiration date and forbids stations to operate during the interim between the
expiration date and the date of action upon any renewal applications not
filed within the prescribed period.
63a. See 2nd Ann. Rep., pp. 159, 161; case of KWKH, Shreveport, la.,
U. S. Daily, Feb. 22, 1930. Also see U. S. Daily, April 25, 1930.
63b. See the recent action of the Commission in refusing, after hearing,
to renew the license of KVEP, Portland, Ore., because of "profanity, ob-
scenity, and villification of particular individuals" (U. S. Daily, May 31, 1930).
See also its refusal of the renewal application of KFKB, Milford, Kans., for
alleged broadcasting of quack medical advertising (U. S. Daily, June 14, 1930).
Both stations appealed. See also U. S. Daily, Feb. 20, 22, 1930, and 2nd Ann.
Rep., pp. 152-170.
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that it does)," but, if it does, the procedure prescribed by Section
14 should be followed. May a licensee whose license is suspended
appeal under Section 16? In other words, does "decision of revoca-
tion" include suspension of license? This is a somewhat different
question than that raised by Section 14 and, under the principles of
statutory construction by the Court in Universal Service Wireless,
Inc. v. Commission,68 the writer believes that no appeal would lie.
It may be assumed that adverse action by the Commission ef-
fective at the end of a license period is not a revocation,6" and must
be considered as action upon a renewal application, if any is on file.
Attention has already been called to the possibility of consider-
ing a modification of license during a license period as a revocation
of license. It is on this theory that an appeal is now pending in
the United States District Court in Connecticut. 17  Since this pro-
ceeding is part of one of the most interesting and tangled juridical
situations which have arisen in radio regulation, the facts that con-
stitute the basis of the appeal will be briefly recounted. Station
WGBS, of New York City, was assigned to operate on 600 kc.
by the Commission a short period before that in which we are in-
terested. With the merits of the opposing claims of the Com-
mission and WGBS (as to whether the assignment to 600 kc. was
conditional, etc.) we need not be concerned. The Commission set
WGBS's renewat applicatiorn foil hearing simultaneously with a
hearing on an application for modification of WICC, of Bridge-
port, Connecticut, to be assigned to 600 kc. The hearing was held
on February 28, 1930.8 On April 21, 1930, the Commission denied
WGBS's renewal application, and granted WICC's application for
modification. 9 The common license period expired on April 30,
64. A hasty search of the authorities by the writer reveals no case in
point. During the period when the writer was general counsel for the Com-
mission, his first assistant. Mr. Donald D. Hughes (since d.eased), rendered
an opinion to the affect that the power to revoke does not imply the power
to suspend.
65. See footnotes 24-27, supra.
66. Two early appeals from decisions of the Commission proceeded upon
this theory, having been taken to district courts of the United States; both
were voluntarily dismissed. One of them was Reynolds Radio Company v.
Commission No. 8597, U. S. D. C., D. of Col., Jan. 9, 1928. This citation was
furnished the writer by Messrs. B. M. Webster, Jr., formerly General Coun-
cel of the Commission, and Paul M. Segal, formerly Assistant General Coun-
sel. The writer does not have the citation of the other case.
67. Bridgeport Broadca.sting Station, Inc. v. Comimission, appeal filed
May 9, 1930.
68. U. S. Daily, Feb. 28, 1930.
69. Ibid., April 22, 1930.
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1930. On April 25th, WGBS appealed to the Court of Appeals,0
and on April 26th, without notice to the Commission, obtained a stay
order from that Court which, in substance, required the Commission
to preserve the status quo pending the appeal.7' Before the stay
order was served on the Commission, however, the Commission had
delivered to the Department of Commerce (for delivery to WICC)
a license authorizing WICC to operate on 600 kc. for the period
commencing April 30, 1930. By a vote of 3 to 2 the Commission
decided that it had no authority to recall the license, and it was duly
delivered to WICC. The Department of Commerce thereupon de-
livered the license. Beginning with April 30, 1930, both WGBS
and WICC operated simultaneously on 600 kc. and, since they are
only 50 miles apart, caused ruinous interference to each' other.
WICC brought suit in the United States District Court in New
York City to restrain WGBS from operating on 600 kc. and in the
same suit asked for $50,000 damages; this suit was later withdrawn.
On May 6, 1930 WGBS filed a petition in the Court of Appeals
asking that the Commission be cited for contempt and that it be
ordered to recall the license issued to WICC. 2 On May 7, 1930,
the Court entered the order, but did not cite the Commission. 8 The
Commission, in compliance with the order, attempted to recall
WICC's license and to substitute authority to it to operate on its
former channel. On May 9, 1930, WICC appealed to the United
States District Court in Connecticut on the theory that this action
of the Commission constituted a revocation of license, and shortly
thereafter secured a stay order from that Court requiring the Com-
mission to permit WICC to continue operating on 600 kc. 74  On
May 13, 1930, WGBS filed a petition with the Commission alleging
that WICC was still operating on 600 kc. and demanding that the
Commission, take stepg foi makJ WICG cease suclh operation.7
WGBS also went into the United States District Court in Connecti-
cut with a bill for injunction against WICC, setting up, inter alia
the unconstitutionality of Section 16 in so far as it permits an appeal
to district courts of the United States, and on May 16, 1930, the
same judge who granted WICC a stay order granted WGBS a
temporary restraining order forbidding WICC to operate on 600
70. Genteral Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Commission, No. 5196. Ibid.,
April 26, 1930.
71. Ibid., April 29, 1930.
72. Lbid., May 7, 1930.
73. Ibid., May 8, 1930.
74. Ibid., May 12, 17, 1930.
75. Ibid., May 15, 1930.
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kc.7 About the same time the Commission filed a motion to dis-
miss WICC's appeal. In the meantime, WMCA, a New York
station operating on 570 kc. filed a petition to intervene in WGBS's
appeal in the Court of Appeals. 78 There the matter stands at the
time this article is written.
Appealable Decisions: Reallocations. For the sake of simplicity,
discussion under this heading will be confined to reallocations of
broadcasting stations, although analogous situations will occasionally
arise outside the broadcast band.
In advance, it may be stated that in the writer's opinion, no
reallocation, no matter how much needed or how well founded as
a matter of radio engineering principles, can justify unfavorable
action upon a renewal application of a station adversely affected,
without prior notice and hearing (either under Section 11 or by
necessary implication from Section 4(f) in the light of fundamental
requirements of due process of law). This seems to be settled
by the General Electric Company case.79  Consequently, not much
can be said under this heading which has not already been covered
in principle. A word may profitably be said, however, in compar-
ing the three major cases of reallocation which have taken place.
In making its first reallocation, effective June 15, 1927, the Com-
mission assumed that Section 4(f) gave it power to make changes
in the assignments of broadcasting stations without prior notice and
hearing. 0 Consequently, the reallocation was put into effect, and
thereafter stations dissatisfied with their assignments were permitted
to apply for better assignments and 'to be heard. Suit was im-
mediately brought against the Commissioners in the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia on Juno 15, 1927, by the Madison
76. Ibid., May 17, 1930.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., May 10, 1930.
79. 31 F. (Z.) 640.
80. Sec. 4 reads as follows: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
the commission, from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity requires, shall-
(f) Make such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may deem
necessary to prevent interference between stations and to carry out the pro-
visions of this Act: Provided, however, That changes in the wave lengths,
authorized power, in the character of emitted signals, or in the times of
operation of any station, shall not be made without the consent of the station
licensee unless, in the judgment of the commission, such changes will promote
public convenience or interest or will serve public necessity or the provisions
of this Act will be more fully complied with;"
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Square Garden Broadcast Association (WMSG),81 attempting to
restrain the reallocation and alleging the unconstitutionality of the
Radio Act of 1927. This suit was later withdrawn. 2  On June 22,
1927, the International Broadcasting Corporation (WGL) appealed
from the Commission's action, claiming a property right in its former
assignment and attacking the constitutionality of the Radio Act.88
The Commission immediately filed its statement of grounds for de-
cision in which it justified its action expressly on Section 4(f) of
the Act." This appeal was later dismissed voluntarily. 5  On July
12, 1927, the People's Pulpit Association (WBBR), having been
unsuccessful in a hearing in which it had sought WJZ's assign-
ment, appealed to the Court of Appeals, 8 not questioning the validity
of the Act but charging a confiscation of its property by the Com-
mission. The Commission filed a statement of grounds for decision,
again justifying its action under Section 4(f).s18 This appeal was
also voluntarily dismissed. Consequently the legal sufficiency of
the Commission's procedure was not subjected to judicial review.
It is not easy to determine what was the precise intention of
Congress in enacting Section 4(f) .8 The maximum license period
prescribed in Section 9 of the Act, as then in force, was for three
and five years, for broadcasting and other stations respectively, and
probably the drafters of the Act wanted to cover the case where,
in order to make possible the adoption and enforcement of regula-
tions for the prevention of interference, some changes in station
assignments during a license period might become necessary. There
was nothing in the Act requiring that broadcasting station licenses
run concurrently with a common expiration date. Even if Section
81. U. S. Daily, June 16, 1927.
82. The argument was postponed, and the plaintiff on June 22, 1927,
entered into a stipulation to abide by the results of the appeal taken by
International Broadcasting Corporation (U. S. Daily, June 17, 18, 20, 22 and
23, 1927). The suit w2Ls thereafter dismissed voluntarily.
83. International Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission, No. 4614.
U. S. Daily, June 23, 1927.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., Aug. 3, 1927.
86. People'4 Pulpit Association v. Conumission, No. 4619, U. S. Daily,
July 13, 1927. Notice of appeal set forth in ibid., July 14, 1927. Appellant
made this first request for a stay order (or temporary injunction) ; it was
denied.
87. U. S. Daily, Aug. 1, 1927.
88. Perhaps also -Congress had in mind changes which. might become
necessary by reason of amendment to the law or the provisions of interna-
,tional treaty. What will happen to the right of appeal in the caset of such
changes is difficult to forecast. At least, the station affected should have the
right to question by appeal the validity and proper construction of the amend-
ment or treaty provision which deprives it of rights it has pleviously enjoyed.
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4(f)' be given a construction authorizing such changes during a
license period, the reference to "public convenience or interest" and
"public necessity," in view of Section 11, seem to imply notice and
hearing;8s a in any event, the changes should be necessitated by
regulations "to prevent interference between stations and to carry
out the provisions of this Act." Congress did not intend changes
consisting simply in supplanting one station with another for reasons
having nothing to do with any regulations, nor, in the writer's opin-
ion, did it intend that changes might be made without notice and op-
portunity for hearing, where the station does not consent. Con-
sequently, the broad position taken by the Commission on the first
two appeals cannot be justified."9
The second, and most far-reaching reallocation, was that which
became effective on November 11, 1928, by which the assignments
of 94% of all broadcasting stations were changed. This was pre-
ceded by action in the nature of a general regulation (General
Order 40 of August 30, 1928) and by opportunity for hearing to
all dissatisfied stations prior to the effective date of the realloca-
tion (which was also the common expiration date of their licenses).
This reallocation has already been sufficiently discussed elsewhere. 90
Under the decisions this procedure seems sufficiently to comply with
the law.
In-the-fall of 1929, there occurred a series of shifts of stations,
involving only a limited number of stations. Irt most cases the
shifts were primarily for) the sake of bettering the assignments
of particular stations, but the result in each case was merely to
transfer trouble to other stations. These shifts, with one excep-
tion, were without prior notice and hearing, and caused a series of
appeals and widespread complaint.9 '
The third and most recent reallocation involved a shift of some
twenty-six stations back and forth on thirteen cleared channels.
It was first devised and announced in the winter of 193092 and an
attempt was made to secure the consent of the stations affected.
Most of the stations were not substantially affected and gave their
88a. It is possible to construe the statute as not necessarily requiring the
procedure specified by Section 11 with respect to notice and hearing, but as
merely requiring sufficient prior notice and hearing of the proposed changes
to meet the elementary essentials of due process of law.
89. There was a third early appeal, Harold E. Smith v. Commission,
No. 4674, Nov. 21, 1927.
90. Radio Prac. & Proc., pp. 154-155. See also text, supra, under heading
"Appealable Decisions-Denials of Applications."
91. U. S. Daily, Nov. 4, 11, 1929; Jan. 27, 28, 1930; Feb. 14, 1930.
92. Ibid., Feb. 13, 1930.
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consents. The justification claimed for the shift was that it in-
creased the average geographical separation between stations on
adjacent channels, but one outstanding fact was that out of the
shuffle WCAU, of Philadelphia, which had been complaining of
its assignment on a relatively inferior channel (1170 kc.) emerged
with the very excellent channel (820 kc.) theretofore used by
WHAS, of Louisville, Kentucky, and the latter station was to be
relegated to an inferior channel (1020 kc.). Another outstanding
fact was that WHAM, Rochester, New York, on the cleared chan-
nel of 1160 kc., was to be shifted to 1170 kc. where KTNT, at
Muscatine, Iowa, which was enjoying "limited time" operation (dur-
ing daylight only) with 5 kilowatts power, had been causing inter-
ference to WCAU. A third outstanding fact was that KYW, Chi-
cago, on a cleared channel (1020 kc.) was to receive a still less
desirable channel (1140 kc.) and was to be subjected to the same
condition in its license about which it was already complaining in
three pending appeals.
On April 7, 1930, the Commission adopted its General Order 87
amending General Order 40 so as to permit the shift in cleared
channel assignments, and, on the same date, acted upon the applica-
tions for renewal of the stations affected by "granting" the applica-
tions in accordance with the new assignments, effective on April 30,
1930.1s The action was not made public until April 14, 1930. The
Commission provided that any station dissatisfied with its assign-
ment might have a hearing on June 17, 1930, if it signified its de-
sire for hearing within a certain specified period. Out of this action
arose two appeals and a suit for injunction. On April 21, 1930,
WHAS appealed to the Court of Appeals and on April 26th ob-
tained a stay order restraining the Commission from making the
proposed change in its assignment." A day or two later KYW
also appealed and on April 26, 1930, obtained a stay order couched
in the broadest terms, restraining the Commission not only from
making the proposed change in its assignment but also from hold-
ing any hearings with regard to the channel of 1020 kc., on whichl
it was then operating.95 On April 24, 1930, WHAM, having chosen
a different route and having instituted suit for injunction in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the Commis-
sioners, obtained a temporary restraining order forbidding the Com-
93. Ibid., April 8, 16, 17, 1930.
94. Courier-Journal Company and Louisville Times Company v. Com-
mission, No. 5190. U. S. Daily, April 22, 29, 1930.
95. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Commission, No. 5192. U. S.
Daily, April 25, 29, 1930.
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mission to change its assignment or to assign any other station to its
channel.98
On April 28, 1930, the Commission adopted an amendment to
its General Order 87, postponing the effective date of the changes
from April 30, 1930, to July 31, 1930, and providing that the hear-
ings scheduled for June 17, 1930, should take place on that date
and that
"all stations affected by the said order and desiring to be heard
shall show cause at that time why said frequencies should not be
changed in accordance with the provisions of General Order No. 87
and the action of the Commission dated April 7, 1930."O'
On May 16, 1930, because the stay order in the KYW case
and the temporary injunction in the WHAM case effectually pre-
vented any hearings, the Commission adopted a further amendment
to General Order 87 indefinitely postponing both the effective date
of the changes and the scheduled hearing during the pendency of
the cases or until the stay order and restraining order were dis-
solved or modified.98
In argument on the WHAM case, counsel for the Commission
contended that "petitioner is barred from relief . . . since
an adequate legal remedy is provided by the Radio Act of 1927,"
and stated in their brief
"That appellant will have a right to appeal is clearly indicated by the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia in the case
of General Electric Company v. Federal Radio Commission."
In the WHAS and KYW cases, counsel for the Commission
filed motions to dismiss the appeals urging
"This Court has no jurisdiction to hear or entertain said appeal. The
decision complained of is a general regulation designated General
Order 87 of the Commission promulgated pursuant to Section 4 (f) of
the Radio Act of 1927 as amended."
In a situation closely resembling the WHAM case, on an appeal now
pending where complaint was made of the assignment of other
stations to appellant's channel without notice or hearing, counsel for
the Commission are urging by motion to dismiss and in their briefs
that no appeal lies.99 The inconsistency is obvious.
96. Stromberg-Carlson Telephone Mfg. Co. v. Chas. McK. Saltzman, et al.,
as the Federal Radio Comonission, in equity No. 51325.
97. U. S. Daily, April 26, 1930.
98. Ibid., May 17, 19, 1930.
99. Journal Company v. Commission, No. 5095.
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Upon the outcome of the appeals in the WHAS and KYW
cases, depend the answers to two important questions which are
not yet settled: (1) whether the Commission, acting under Sec-
tion 4(f), or otherwise, has power to make changes in a station's
assignment at the end of a license period without prior notice and
opportunity for hearing and (2) whether the making of such changes,
accompanied by the empty privilege of a hearing after the changes
go into effect, is an appealable decision on pending applications for
renewal, prior to the hearing and decision thereon.
Appealable Decisions: Regulations. No appeal lies under Sec-
tion 16 from a regulation as such, as distinguished from actions on
particular applications pending before the Commission. It is pos-
sible, however, that an action of the Commission may take the form
of a regulation and at the same time constitute a denial of a pending
application. This was virtually the case presented in Carrell v. Com-
mission. °  By its General Order 30 of May 10, 1928, the Com-
mission directed that after July 1, 1928, "all portable broadcasting
stations will cease operations." On appeal the regulation was at-
tacked by the owner of several portable stations which had been
forced to discontinue, and was passed upon and upheld by the Court.
It was partly the case in General Electric Company v. Com-
mission, in which the Court of Appeals took the effective date of
the reallocation of November 11, 1928 (under General Order 40)
to be the effective date of the Commission's decision, as distinguished
from the actual date of the Commission's action upon the applica-
tion for renewal (which was October 12, 1928).
Section 16, therefore, differs from Section 5 covering appeals
from the Secretary of Commerce to the Commission; the latter sec-
tion provided that such appeals might be taken from "any decision,
determination or regulation of the Secretary of Commerce."''
As has been pointed out elsewhere, 1 2 there is no reason why
regulations of the Commission should not be questioned, passed upon,
and upheld or set aside by the Court of Appeals in proper cases
where the Commission's decisions on particular applications result
100. 36 F. (2d) 117.
101. In view of amendment to the Radio Act of 1927 continuing the
Commission as the licensing authority, and of the likelihood that S. J. Res.
176, transferring the Radio Division of the Department of Commerce to the
Commission, seems likely to pass, the appeal provisions of Sec. 5 will probably
never be given effect.
102. Radio Prac. & Proc., pp. 153-156.
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from such regulations. The Court of Appeals, in view of its broad
administrative function, probably has power to determine whether or
not a regulation meets the test of "public interest, convenience or
necessity," the standard which must be followed by the Commission
in adopting regulations under Section 4. While the statute does not
give the Court of Appeals authority itself to adopt other regulations
its power may be said to resemble that of judicial tribunals in passing
on the validity of rates prescribed by rate-making tribunals; new
rates may not be prescribed but the limits which must be observed
if confiscation is to be avoided may be pointed out, and the principles
for determining valid rates may be established. In analogous fashion
the standard ot "public interest, convenience or necessity'" may
achieve a more definite meaning.
Where, because of conflict with some regulation, the Commis-
sion denies an application without hearing, such a decision may be
regarded as similar to a judgment rendered on pleadings. An appeal
should be permitted to the applicant, and on appeal he should have
the right to question the regulation which prevented him from being
accorded a hearing under Section 11. The Court of Appeals should
be considered as having power to pass on the regulation and, if it
finds the regulation valid and sufficient under the test of public
interest, convenience or necessity, should uphold the Commission's
decision. If the Court finds that the regulation is invalid or that
it fails to meet the test, the Court should remand the case to the
Commission for hearing. It should not, in the writer's opinion, at-
tempt to grant the application on a record which contains no evidence
in support of, or in opposition to, the application on the issues of
fact raised by it. The application, though sworn to, is an ex parte
document; investigation and hearing may disclose that its contents
are untrue or exaggerated, or that there are reasons in fact for re-
fusing the application. In the General Electric Company case, how-
ever, the Court's judgment required the Commission to grant an
application in a case where the application was on its face inconsistent
with a regulation of the Commission (General Order 40) and had
consequently been denied without hearing by the Commission. 8
Persons entitled to appeal: When it has been determined what
are, and what are not, appealable decisions, an answer has been given
to the question as to what persons are entitled to appeal. As may be
seen from previous sub-headings, there are several difficult problems
as to what constitutes a denial of any of the four classes of applica-
103. See case comments in Harv. L. Rev., Vol. 42, p..948; Mich. L. Rev.,
Vol. 28, V. 194.
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tions specified in Section 16. There is no difficult problem, however,
as to who may appeal, once an action of the Commission has been
found to constitute a denial. Only the denied applicant has this
right, no one else.'" Similarly, in cases of revocation of license,
only the licensee whose license is revoked may appeal. The failure
of the statute to make provision for appeal by parties respondent to
the application in the 'proceedings before the Commission (so that, if
the application is granted, any respondent who is aggrieved thereby
may appeal, and, if it is denied and the applicant appeals, the respon-
dent may take part in the appeal as an appellee) is one of the most
vital defects in the entire Radio Act of 1927, and is in large measure
the basis for the claim of invalidity now being urged against it.05
Intervention: In several cases, all of them involving broadcast-
ing stations, the Court of Appeals has granted petitions to intervene
filed in behalf of stations which were parties respondent to the hear-
ings before the Commission, and has specifically given such inter-
venors the status of appellees. This was done in Chicago Federation
of Labor v. Commission, ' 8 on the petition of the owners of Station
WBBM, the channel assigned to which was applied for by appellant.
WBBM was given all the full status of an appellee, and was per-
mitted to file briefs and participate in the oral argument. It has also
been done in other appeals now pending. 07 A different kind of in-
tervention was effected in Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. ,Commis-.
sipn, consisting of an appeal by the successful respondent (Agricul-
tural Broadcasting Company, WLS). The danger of pursuing this
course is evidenced by the fact that the Court took jurisdiction to
the extent of reducing the time of the respondent in favor of the
appellant.
In the Short Wave Cases,108 the Court denied a petition to inter-
vene filed by Press Wireless, Inc., a grantee of permits and licenses,
104. The failure of the Court of Appeals to grant the Commission's
motion to dismiss the appeal of the State of New York in the General Electric
Company case must be regarded as an unintentional slip, without significance
as a precedent.
105. See footnote-above. Section 11, governing hearings by the Com-
mission, likewise accords no right of notice or hearing to interested parties
other than the applicant and may be subject to the same claim of invalidity
as is being made against Section 16. See 1929 Radio Committee Reports, pp.
461-469. 475-476.
106. Not yet reported, U. S. Daily, May 9, 1930.
107. WMAK Broadcasting System, Inc. (WMAK) v. Commission, No.
5117 (the applicant before the Commission, whose application was granted
was permitted to intervene) ; Northwest Broadcasting System, Inc. (KJR) v.
Commission, No. 5112 (the successful applicant before the Commission was
again permitted to intervene; the appeal has since been voluntarily dismissed).
108. See footnote 16, sutra.
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
although certain of the appellants were attacking the Commission s
decisions which resulted in the granting of the permits and licenser
to the petitioner and claimed that they constituted a denial of appel-
lants' applications, since, together with other decisions of the Com-
mission, they disposed of all but one of the channels suitable for the
services proposed by the applicants.'0 9 The Court's action is dis-
tinguishable, since the petition to intervene expressly reserved all
rights to object to the jurisdiction of the Court to deprive it of priv-
ileges granted by the Commission. The Court did, however, accord
the petitioner the status of amicus curiae and permitted it to file
briefs within ten days after appellants filed their briefs. 110 The
American Telephone & Telegraph Company, also interested in the
subject matter of the case, was likewise given the status of amicus
curiae, and filed briefs."'
Scope of Court's Jurisdiction on Appeal: The last paragraph of
Section 16 provides:
"At the earliest convenient time the court shall hear, review, and
determine the appeal upon said record and evidence, and may alter or
revise the decision appealed from and enter such judgment as to it
may seem just. The revision by the court shall be confined to the points
set forth in the reasons of appeal."
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that Section 16
"does no more than make that court a superior and revising agency
in the same field." 112
In the Short-Wave Appeals, it is being urged before the Court
of Appeals that Section 16, properly construed, does not confer
power or jurisdiction upon that Court to enter any judgment adversely
affecting any person not given the status of a party by that section,
i.e., any person other than appellant or the Commission. In support
of this contention, such arguments are advanced as that unless Sec-
tion 16 be given the restricted construction, it is unconstitutional;
that it must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only
the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon
that score;" 8 and that the language of the section supports the re-
109. Petition of Press Wireless, Inc.; U. S. Daily, Mar. 27, 29, 31,
April 2, 3, 1930.
110. Ibid., April 3, 1930. Briefs were filed April 15, 1930. U. S. Daily,
April 17, 1930.
111. U. S. Daily, April 30, 1930. Oral argument was postponed to the
October term, ibid., April 29, 1930.
112. Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, Adv. Ops.,
1929-1930, p. 514.
113. U. S. v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210; Carey v. So. Dakota,
250 U. S. 118; Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Cd., 258 U. S. 204.
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stricted construction (e.g., no mention is made of anyone except
appellant and the Commission; no provision is made for filing of
any document by anyone else, while precise limitations are imposed
on both appellant and the Commission in this regard; the record
filed by the Commission must consist of "all papers and evidence
presented to it upon the original application," not papers presented
to it upon another's application; the privilege, upon certain con-
ditions, of adducing additional evidence is expressly conferred upon
"either party," not third parties; etc.). In reply it is urged that,
if Section 16 be given the restricted construction, the right of appeal
is worthless; that the broad construction must be adopted in order
to give effect to the manifest intention of Congress that the Com-
mission's actions on application be open to review by the Court of
Appeals, etc. In rebuttal to the foregoing, it is argued that the over-
sights of Congress in failing to foresee the nature of controversies
which would arise in radio regulation and in failing to provide a
procedure suitable for their determination, cannot be remedied by
judicial decision; that the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon the
Court by Section 16 being statutory, the powers of the Court must
be found expressly in the statute, etc. 18a
There is nothing in the Court's decisions to date indicating what
answer it will give to the question presented by the Short-Wave Ap-
peals. None of its final judgments (as distinguished from its stay
orders) has adversely affected a party not before the Court; in fact,
it has reversed the Commission on only three occasions. In the first
of the three, the General Electric Company case, the decision ad-
versely affected KGO in Oakland, California, but KGO, as well as
WGY, was owned by appellant and appellant was seeking the relief
it was given. In the Richmond Development Corporation case,""
no direct injury was caused to third parties, since the result was
merely to require another extension for time of completion of a
station for which a permit had previously been granted. In the
Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. case,"i5 the Company adversely af-
fected by the judgment had voluntarily subjected itself to the Court's
jurisdiction by itself appealing.
In Sumner-Tacoma Stage Co. v. Department of Public
113a. Sheldon v. Sill. 8 How. 441; Saltrnarsh v. Tuthill, 12 How. 387;
Carlin v. Goldberg, 45 App. D. C. 540; United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106;
Mim. & St. Louis R. R.,Co. v. Board of R. Commrs., 44 Minn. 336, 46 N'.
W. 559.
114. 35 F. (2d) 883.
115. 37 F. (2d) 993.. .
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Works,11 the Supreme Court of Washington held that where one
of two applications to the Department of Public Works for a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity was allowed under the
Auto Transportation Act of that State, the successful applicant was
a necessary party entitled to notice of the review proceedings before
its right could be affected. The Court said, inter alia:
"But was the Shields Transportation Company also a necessary
party and was it entitled to notice of the review proceedings before its
rights could be affected? We 'are of the opinion it was. It was the
successful party before the department. Its application had been
granted. It had thus acquired valuable rights, which could not be taken
from it without its having its day in court. This it has not had. The
judgment may have been binding on the department, but that would
not accomplish anything.
"It cannot be justly said that the transportation company was repre-
sented by the department of public works. That department had acted
as a court and had granted certain rights. Thereafter and in the review
proceedings it was interested only in assisting the court to make such
judgment in the premises as would be just and right. It represented
only the public interest."
As to whether a decision such as the foregoing is to be deemed
applicable to Section 16 of the Radio Act, the writer expresses no
opinion.
In several broadcasting cases it has been contended by the Com-
mission that the appeal becomes moot after the lapse of the maxi-
mum period for which the Commission could have issued a license,
i. e., three months. For example, in the General Electric Company
case, the appeal complained of a denial of a renewal application,
the renewal license covering the period of three months commencing
November 11, 1928. If the Commission had granted the application,
the mosi appellant would have received was ' license expiring
February 11, 1929, at which time the Commission would have had
again to pass upon a new renewal application and determine whether
public interest, convenience or necessity would be served by granting
it. On February 21, 1929, the Commission filed a written motion to
dismiss on this ground; this motion was overruled by the necessary
implication of the judgment.11 5b Similar motions were made in. other
l15a 1927, 254 Pac. 245. A number of cases are therein cited and
discussed.
115b. The cases relied upon by the Commission in support of Its mo-
tion were Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U. S. 446; American
Book Co. v. Kansas, ex rel. Nichols, 193 U. S. 49; Jones v. Montagne, 194
.U. S. 147; Cheong Ah Moy v. U. S., 113 U. S. 216; California v. San Pablo
& T. R. Co., 149 U. S. 308; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651; U. S. ex rel. Gan-
non v. Georgetown College 28 App. D. C. 92; State ex rel. Rowe v. Martin,
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appeals then pending and in one of them 115' the Court passed ex-
pressly on the point, saying:
"It is argued on behalf of the Commission that this appeal presents
a moot question because of the fact that the Commission may not issue
a license for a longer period than three months, and that, if the Com-
mission had issued the renewal license which appellant applied for, such
license would long since have expired according to its own terms. It is
argued that, since the period for which the license might have been
issued has expired, this appeal has become moot, and should be dismissed.
We do not agree with this contention. Such an interpretation of the
act would practically nullify the right of appeal granted by Congress in
such cases, for it is rarely possible for a station to secure a decision
upon such an appeal within three months after the right of appeal
accrues. This fact was of course well known to Congress when the
statute was enacted. Moreover the relief sought by an applicant for
renewal is not limited to the issue of a license for three months only,
but includes a continuing right to apply thereafter at proper times for
successive renewals thereof. The statutory appeal accordingly con-
templates the restoration to the appellant, if his claim be sustained, of
the continuing right to make such application to the Commission as he
would have enjoyed had his application first been allowed. We feel
justified therefore in entertaining the appeal. Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 31 S. Ct. 279,
55 L. Ed. 310."
In a previous subheading the writer has expressed his opinion
that, so far as the subject matter of appeals is concerned, the Court
of Appeals has power to pass on regulations of the Commission
and either to uphold them or to invalidate them.16
To what extent may the Court of Appeals, being an adminis-
trative tribunal, pass on questions of law, and particularly on ques-
tions of constitutional law? In logic, it is submitted, there is only
one limitation: where the fundamental validity of the Radio Act
of 1927 is attacked. In the earlier cases, the claim was regularly
made that the Act was unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment ;117 the Commission made the point that an appellant-
applicant, having proceeded both before the Commission and the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of that law, could not be
(Fla.) 32 So. 926; State ex rel. Vann v. Martin, (Fla.) 36 So. 362; Galzin
v. Davidson, (Fla.) 37 So. 575; Yent v. State, 63 So. 452; Agee v. Cate,
(Ala.) 61 So. 900; State ex rel. Kern v. Owens, (Ind.) 91 N. E. 562; State
ex rel. McClanahan v. Noftzger, (Ind.) 91 N. E. 562.
115c. Technical Radio Labroatory v. Commission, 36 F. (2d) 111.
116. General Electric Company v. Commission, 31 F. (2d) 630; Carrell
v. Commission, 36 F. (2.d) 117.
117. General Electric Company v. Commission, supra; Technical Radio
Laboratory v. Commission, 36 F. (2d) 111; Cit of New York v. Federal
Radio Commission, 36 F. (2d) 115.
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heard to question its validity.1 ' The Court did not pass on the
contention, but upheld the Act as valid.
There is no reason, however, why the validity of particular
sections, not affecting the entire act, may not be adjudicated by
the Court of Appeals. If a licensee were refused a renewal of
license by reason of the drastic provisions of Section 13, he should
be able to attack the section on appeal. If an application is denied
as the result of the Davis Amendment (Section 5 of the Amendatory
Act of March 28, 1928), the validity of the amendment should be
open to question on appeal.
May the Court of Appeals enter judgment against an appellant
giving him less than he was accorded by the Commission? To
illustrate, suppose that in the Great Lakes Broadcasting Company
case, WLS alone had been involved; that, having 5/7 time, it ap-
plied for full time and was denied by the Commission; on appeal
may the Court of Appeals decrease it to 1/2 time, or to no time
at alt? In such a case, the writer believes that, since the Court's
revision is confined to the points set forth in the reasons of appeal,
the Court should not be considered to have such power. Is the
situation changed jurisdictionally by the fact that WENR and
WCBD were also appealing? At best, the Court's decision seems
doubtful to the writer.
Stay Orders: This subject is closely related to that discussed
under the preceding subheading. Manifestly the Court of Appeals
has no greater power with respect to stay orders than it has with
respect to its final judgments. Yet, whereas the Court has not yet
entered any final judgment adversely affecting a party which had
not voluntarily submitted to the Court's jurisdiction, it has not ob-
served the same limitations with regard to stay orders.
The Court's power to issue these orders has been one of the
most bitterly contested issues raised under Section 16. The first
attempt to obtain such an order was in an early appeal which was
later voluntarily dismissed; the motion was denied." 9 The next at-
tempt was in the General Electric Company case, wherein a stay
order was granted on November 9, 1928, the same day the appeal
was filed.120 It ordered
"that a stay be, and the same is hereby, granted, and that until the
further order of the court Radio Station WGY of the applicant-appel-
118. Wall v. Parrott Silver & Copper Co., 244 U. S. 407, 411; Hirsh v.
Block, 50 App. D. C. 56, 267 Fed. 614, and cases therein cited.
119. People's Pulpit Association v. Commission, No. 4619. U. S. Daily,
July 13, 14, Aug. 1, 1927.
120. U. S. Daily, Nov. 10, 1928.
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lant,!be, and it is hereby, permitted to operate full time on channel 790
kilocycles."
A motion by the Commission to set aside the stay order was argued
in briefs of the parties and orally, but was never passed on. Under
the peculiar facts of the case, however, the stay order did not affect
any third parties.
The next stay order was issued on December 7, 1929, in the
Short Wave Appeal. The petition for the order, which had been
filed on June 24, 1929, was followed by extensive briefs and by
oral argument on the petition.121 This stay order, which was se-
cured by one of the three appellants (Intercity Radio Telegraph
Company and its affiliate, Wireless Telegraph & Communications
Company), after brief preliminary recitals, ordered
"that during the pendency of these appeals, or until the further orders
of the court herein, no permits or licenses shall be granted or issued by
the Federal Radio Commission to other applicants for so many of the
available frequencies requested by appellants as to reduce the remaining
number of available frequencies below the number sufficient to give
effect to the decision of this court herein should it be held by the court
that appellants' applications should have been granted."
In the domestic high frequency band alone, as has already been ex-.
plained, the Commission's decisions had disposed of all but one of
the channels, but pending the Court's decision on the petition for
stay order it had withheld issuance of permits or licenses to the
successful applicants (only one of which, R. C. A. Communications,
Inc.) was an appellant in the Short Wave Appeals. The stay order
was so broad in its terms, however, that it, in view of appellant's
applications, seemed to cover also the transoceanic high frequency
and the low frequency band, with the result that thereafter the Com-
mission withheld issuance of licenses covering transoceanic high
frequency channels to persons who had completed construction of
stations under construction permits issued as early ao August 1,
1928. A motion by the Commission for clarification of the stay
order was denied.
2
Thereafter the Commission, construing the stay order to pro-
tect only the appellant upon whose petition it was granted, took
action by which it issued construction permits and licenses covering
approximately two-thirds of the channels awarded to each of the
successful applicants, but conditioned the instruments upon the
121. Ibid., July 2, 1929; October 21, 1929; Dec. 9, 1929.
122. Ibid., Dec. 31, 1929; Jan. 4, 18, 1930.
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ultimate judgment of the Court of Appeals. 2 8  During the course
of the delivery of these instruments, after part of them were in the
hands of successful applicants, a second appellant (Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Company), without notice, secured a second stay order,
holding up delivery of the remainder.' 2 ' The third appellant fol-
lowed with another petition for a stay order in which it sought to
force the Commission to re-possess itself of the licenses and permits
already delivered.12  This third stay order was granted but the
Court declined the additional relief requested. 128 A later 'attempt
was made without success to secure mitigation of the terms of the
order with respect to one of the concerns adversely affected.
27
Several other stay orders have been issued since the one of
December 7, 1929, in the Short Wave Appeals, all in cases involv-
ing broadcasting stations. In one case a stay order was granted
on the petition of a station which had been respondent to another
station's application for modification before the Commission;"' in
another case of the same character a petition was refused. 2  Refer-
ence has already been made to the stay orders secured by WHAS
and KYW to prevent changes in their assignments proposed by
General Order 87; and to the stay orders secured by WGBS and
WICC respectively from the Court of Appeals and from the United
States District Court in Connecticut, in their controversy over the
channel of 600 kc.
The Court's power to issue stay orders adversely affecting
parties not before it raises the same question as that discussed under
the preceding heading and need not be further considered. An
equally important question is: has the Court any power to issue
stay orders at all?
Section 11 of the Act creating the Court of Appeals gives it
"power to issue all necessary and proper remedial prerogative writs in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction."'31 0
Writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, supersedeas and injunc-
tion have all been considered as within the authority conferred by
123. Ibid., Feb. 26, 27, 1930.
124. Ibid. Feb. 27, 1930.
125. Ibid., Mar. 15, 17, 1930.
126. Ibid., Mar. 24, 1930.
127. Ibid., April 3, 1930.
128. Northwest Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Commission, No. 5112
(later voluntarily dismissed), U. S. Daily, Dec. 16, 1929; see also Dec. 13,
14, 31, 1929.
129. WMAK Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Commission, No. 5117, U. S.
Daily, Jan. 24, 1930; see also Dec. 23, 30, 1929.
130. Dist. of Columbia Code, Sec. 230, 27 Stat. 434, et seq.
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the statute.18' The Commission has urged, however, that the statute
(which creates the Court as a judiciat tribunal and governs its
powers as such) should not be extended to apply to the special ap-
pellate jurisdiction of an administrative character conferred upon
it by Section 16 of the Radio Act of 1927; that, in accordance with
the doctrine of cases already cited above,'18 2 the Court's powers must
be found expressly stated in Section 16, and that, since Section 16
confers no authority to issue stay orders, the Court does not have
that authority. It is undoubtedly true, as contended by the appellants
who have sought stay orders, that, for appeals from decisions of
the Commission to have any substantial value, it is frequently nec-
essary to preserve the status quo. Whether Congress made ade-
quate provision to meet the necessity is, of course, another question.
The Radio Act of 1927 gives the reviewing court no power to
issue licenses. The Commission contends that this is precisely what
was accomplished by the stay orders entered in the General Electric,
Company (WGY), the Northwest Broadcasting System, Inc.
(KJR), and the General Broadcasting System. Inc. (WGBS) cases.
The Radio Act forbids, under heavy penalties imposed by Section 33,
any person to engage in radio communication except under and in
accordance with a license from the licensing authority (i. e., the
Commission). Ordinarily a stay is not conceived to be applicable
to a self-executing decision such as a refusal by the Commission
to grant an application for renewal of license.
Effective date of Commission's decision: The notice of appeal
must be filed "within twenty days after the decision complained of
is effective." Compliance with this requirement manifestly is a
jurisdictional prerequisite.
The construction of this provision is in a state of uncertainty.
In the General Electric Company case, the holding seemed to be that
the effective date of a denial of an application for renewal of license
is the first day of the succeeding license period,1 33 which in that case
was November 11, 1928. The Commission's decision on the ap-
plication was actually made on October 12, 1928 (pursuant to a
tentative reallocation effective November llth), and two appeals
were taken therefrom, one on November 9th and the other on No-,
131. King v. Nuckols, 38 App. D. C. 441; Gritts v. Fisher, 37 App.
D. C. 473. See also In re MacFarland, 30 App. D. C. 499; In re Dahlgren,
30 App. D. C. 588; Goldsmith v. Valentine, 35 App. D. C. 299; Beal v. Cox, 14
App. D. C. 368; U. S. ex rel. Morris v. Scot , 25 App. D. C. 88; U. S. ex rel.
Holmead v. Barnard, 29 App. D. C. 431; Truck Co. v. Motor Co., 41 App.
D. C. 261.
132. See footnote (13a), supra.
133. See facts as set forth in Radio Prac. & Proc., pp. 154-155.
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vember 30th (the second being the result of a motion by the Com-
mission to dismiss the first). The Court's opinion suggests that the
first appeal may have been premature. 8 '
Later, however, in three cases 8' the Court sustained motions
by the Commission to dismiss for failure to file the notice within the
prescribed 20-day period. Two of these clearly raised the same
point: the appeals were from denials of applications for renewal of
license and were filed within 20 days of the beginning of the suc-
ceeding license period, but not within 20 days of the dates of the
Commission's actual decisions. While the Court's actions were not
accompanied by opinion, the only ground for dismissal urged by
the Commission's motions was failure to file within the 20-day
period. The same point is involved in a case now pending before
the Commission.
It makes very little difference (so far as renewal applications
are concerned) which construction of Section 16 is adopted, but it
is desirable that the point be determined. Logic seems to lie on the
side of calculating the period from the date of the Commission's
decision, unless the Commission itself specifies a later date as the
effective date. The word "effective" was used in Section 16 ap-
parently to meet the requirements of the procedure prescribed for
revocation of licenses in Section 14; it has no particular significance
when applied to decisions on applications for license, etc. Yet, in
view of the present practices of the Commission, the construction
adopted in the General Electric Company case will help to relieve
applicants from injustices which they have constantly suffered
because of the Commission's frequent failure to make known its
decisions in any formal manner for days and even two or more
weeks after the decisions are actually made. In the case of an ap-
plicant living on the Pacific Coast, notice of the Commission's de-
cision may not reach him until too late to perfect an appeal. 186 On
the other hand, the construction adopted in the General Electric Com-
pany case would be difficult to apply to decisions on applications for
construction permits or for licenses.
134. 31 F. (2d) 630.
135. By-Products Coal Co. v. Commission, No. 4984; Burton Coal Co. v.
Commission, No. 4985; Wilmington Transportation Co. V. Commission, No.
5118, U. S. Daily, Nov. 19, 1929, Dec. 27, 1929. A motion for reconsideration
was filed in the first two cases and was denied. U. S. Daily, Dec. 2, 1929.
The writer is not certain whether in the third case the appeal was too late
under any construction of the statute.
136. This happened in the Wilmington Transportation Co. case.
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Notice of Appeal and of Reasons Therefor: Service Thereof.
No holding has yet been made with regard to the form or contents
of notices of appeal or of the statement of reasons which must ac-
company them. In practice, the documents actually filed have varied
extremely, from very short informalla 6a statements, unsworn to, to
long argumentative statements under oath.
In the writer's opinionj the notice of appeal should consist
simply in a brief statement that an appeal is thereby taken from
a specified decision of the Commission under Section 16 of the
Radio Act of 1927, and the decision should be described sufficiently
to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the section. The descrip-
tion should include (a) a characterization of the decision as a re-
fusal of, an application for construction permit (or license, etc.,
as the case may be), or a revocation of license; (b) the date on
which the decision was effective, and (c) a reference to the Com-
mission's hearing-docket number (when there has been a hearing)
under which the proceedings were had; otherwise, to the Commis-
sion's file numbers of the applications or licenses. The last, while
perhaps not essential, will serve to avoid misunderstanding as to
what decision is in question.
The statement of reasons may be confined to an enumeration
of respects in which the Commission is claimed to have erred,
analogous to an assignment of errors. Following the analogy of
rules applicable to assignments of errors, general claims (such as
that the decision did not serve public interest, convenience or ne-
cessity) run the danger of being held insufficient, and the claims
should therefore be as specific as the nature of the case permits.
In order to present an intelligible statement on appeal, it is frequently
advisable to preface the enumeration of reasons with a brief descrip-
tion of the nature of the case; this has been done in a number of
the appeals heretofore taken. Care should be taken, however, to
confine statements of fact to matters which will ultimately appear
from the record sent up by the Commission, at least in cases where
a hearing has beenr held. In cases where no hearing has been
held, the appellant's statement has been used as the vehicle for a
long pleading setting up facts which will not appear in the Com-
136a. The most extreme case of informality which has come to the
writer's attention is that of Lannie W. Stewart v. Commission, No. 5158,and Chicago Federation of Labor v. Commission, No. 4989, both of which
were voluntarily dismissed.
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mission's record. 187 Where the line is to be drawn in such cases
is not easy to determine. The statement of reasons should not, in
the writer's opinion, be made to serve as a substitute for the taking
of additional testimony under the provision therefor in Section 16.
If, in such cases as the General Electric Company case, the Court
would confine itself to remanding the case for hearing where op-
portunity for hearing has improperly been denied by the Commis-
sion, neither appellant nor the Commission would be under the
temptation of attempting to set forth elaborate cases on the facts
in their documents filed with the court, and can safely restrict them-
selves to statements sufficient to reveal the legal questions involved.
In cases where an appellant has sought to attack decisions of
the Commission granting applications of others, the decisions have
been specifically referred to in appellant's statement of reasons and
have been alleged to be erroneous for specified reasons."a" Where
this is not done, it seems likely that appellant will be held to have
foreclosed himself from attacking such decisions, the Court's re-
vision being confined to the reasons for appeal.
In all but one.. of the appeals thus far decided, the statements
of reasons have been accompanied by affidavits of the truth of the
allegations therein contained. The writer believes that an affidavit
is not necessary. A petition for stay order, however, should be
supported by affidavit and, if the statement of reasons is used as
the basis for such a petition, it should be sworn to.
Since the statute requires service of a "certified" copy on the
Commission before filing with the Court of Appeals, notice to the
Commission should be attached, together with provision for acknowl-
edgment of service by the Commission. There should also be at-
tached a certificate that the copy served is a true copy of the docu-
ment to be filed. 9 For the sake of ultra-caution, some attorneys
have served copies upon the Commission both before and after filing
with the Court of Appeals, the second copy being certified by the
137. The notable example of this was the General Electric Company
case in which the notice of appeal was accompanied by a long statement of
reasons under oath, into which were incorporated by reference about 200 pages
of documents, affidavits and unsworn jStters of third parties. A motion by the
Commission to strike these portions of the document was not passed upon
by the Court.
137a. This was done by the several applicants in the Short Wave Cases,
see footnote 16, supra.
138. Chicago Federation of Labor v. Commission, not yet reported, U. S.
Daily, May 9, 1930.
139. See forms suggested for this purpose by Moncure Burke, Esq., in
Notes on Practice, Court of Appeals, 2nd ed., Wash., 1928, pp. 104-105, re-
printed with supplementary forms in this issue of JOURNAL OF AiR LAW.
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Clerk of the Court as a true copy. This, in the opinion of the
writer, is unnecessary.
Motionm to Dismiss: The Commission has, in many of the
appeals, filed motions to dismiss and has thereafter filed its state-
ment of grounds for decision accompanied by a reservation of its
rights under the motions. There have been involuntary dismissals
before oral argument in three cases,' and one after oral argu-
ment.1 4 In several pending cases the Court has reserved decision
upon such motions until after argument on the merits.' Until
it is determined how much or how little should be incorporated in
the notice of appeal and statement of reasons therefor, it is difficult
to reach any conclusion as to when, if at all, a motion to dismiss
may be determined on the basis of insufficiencies in those docu-
ments." "
In several of the cases, motions to dismiss have been accom-
panied by typewritten briefs, have been answered by appellants, and
have been again supported by reply briefs.
Record Filed by Commission. Section 16 requires that
"within twenty days after the filing of said appeal the licensing author-
ity shall file with the court the originals or certified copies of all papers
and evidence presented to it upon the original application for a permit
or license or in the hearing upon said order of revocation."
Where the Commission has held a hearing, in which all inter-
ested parties have participated, no particular difficulty arises as to
what should be included in the record. The evidence heard at the
Commission's formal hearings is always transcribed and, together
with the applications and the decision, constitutes the record on
appeal. In cases where no hearing has been held, or, if held, has
not been participated in fully by all interested parties, the proper
contents of the record are not easy to determine.
Where no hearing has been held, the Commission has, on oc-
casions, sent up a record which incorporated such documents and
140. See footnote 35, supra.
141. Universal Service Wireless, Inc. v. Commission, not yet reported,
U. S. Daily, May 8, 1930.
142. For a general discussion and enumeration of grounds for dismissal
which may be urged on such a motion, see Burke, Notes on Practice, etc.(2nd ed.), Secs. 53, et seq.
143. Particular notice should be taken of the rule requiring that motions
should be presented in three ribbon copies and one carbon. Burke, Notes on
Practice, etc. (2nd ed.), Sec. 22.
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evidence from its files as it has deemed necessary to meet the con-
tentions made by appellant in his statement of reasons for appeal.
This practice, while improper, has been necessary to meet statements
of reasons which consist in long recitals of fact under oath.
In cases where a hearing has been held and appellant complains
of the Commission's action in granting another's application as a
denial of appellant's application, the evidence heard in support of
the successful application may be (as it was in the Short Wave
Appeals) under an entirely different docket number in the Commis-
sion's records in a hearing in which appellant did not participate.
Or the successful application may have been granted without hear-
.ing, or partly as the result of a hearing and partly as the result
of informal hearings held by the Commission of which no record
was kept, or as the result of investigations made by individual mem-
bers of the Commission, its engineers or its other employes. In
such cases, no record which the, Commission can transmit to the
Court will truly reflect the facts and grounds upon which the Com-
mission made the decision on the successful application.
If the record filed by the Commission is incomplete because
of omission of specific documents or evidence the defect may be sup-
plied by the usual suggestions of diminution of record.
1 4
Commission's Statement of Grounds for Decision. The Com-
mission has interpreted the Radio Act as not requiring it to render
written statements of grounds for decision except in cases where
appeals are taken from its decisions. Consequently, the statements
heretofore filed in the Court of Appeals have in each case been
prepared in response to appellants' statement of reasons for appeal,
and have been drawn up by the Commission's legal division. For
this reason, they frequently resemble briefs rather than opinions,
and do not necessarily reflect the reasoning of the Commission in
reaching its decisions.
In preparing its statement the Commission is faced with ques-
tions analogous to those which occur in making up its record, in
cases where no hearing has been held or where decisions granting
the applications of others are attacked. In such cases, the statements
filed are occasionally all there is in the record setting forth the facts
on which the Commission relies to justify its decision.
144. For procedure and form to be used, see Burke, Notes on Practice,
etc. (2nd e.), Sec. 62.
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Unfortunately the statements of grounds heretofore filed by
the Commission are not all available in a form accessible to the
practicing lawyer, and such as are available must be searched for
in files of the United States Daily, in the annual reports of the Com-
mission, and, to a limited extent, in mimeographed form in the
office of the Secretary of the Commission.145
Additional Evidence. All the law there is on'this subject is to
be to found in Section 16, since the Court has granted only two
petitions to adduce additional evidence'4"a and, in these cases and in
the several cases where it has denied- petitions, has not stated its
reasons for so doing.
Ir one case in which such a petitiorn was filed' the peti-
tion asked that the Commissioners themselves be required to testify
as to their decisions and reasons therefor in other cases, which, it
was claimed, were inconsistent with the decision appealed from.17
In another case, which was later voluntarily dismissed, appellant
based a petition on alleged erroneous statements in the Commission's
statement of grounds.148  In still another case, 49 the Court reserved
its ruling on a petition until argument on the merits.
In cases where the Commission's decision has been without
hearing, the question arises as to whether leave to adduce evidence
may be granted at all. The answer depends on the significance
to be given to the word "additional." If in such a case a real issue
of fact is raised, and a hearing has improperly been refused, the
145. Two statements are reprinted in full in the 2nd Ann. Rep., pp. 244-
249 (International Quotation" Co., Ine., No. 4828; Bull Insular Lines, No.
4832) ; excerpts from statements are reprinted in the 3rd Ann. Rep., pp. 31-43(Technical Radio Laboratory, No. 4835; City of New York. No. 4898; Car-
rell, No. 4899; Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., et al, Nos. 4900, 4901, 4902;
Chicago Federation of Labor, No. 4972; Head of the Lakes Broadcasting Co.,
No. 4976; Baker, No. 5004; By-Products Coal Co., No. 4984; Universal
Service Wireless, Inc., No. 5005; Intercity Radio Telegraph Co., et al., Nos.
4987, 4988, 4990, 4991). Statements have been reprinted in full in a number
of cases in the U. S. Daily from time to time.
145a. In two of the three first appeals taken from decisions of the
Commission denying applications, the Commission was granted permission to
adduce additional evidence.
146. Bull Insular Lines, Inc. v. Commission, No. 4832, U. S. Daily,
Oct. 8, 1928.
147. The denial of applications for point-to-point service, using trans-
oceanic high frequencies, for the purposes of an individual business as dis-
tinguished from public correspondence.
148. Lannie W. Stewart v. Commission, No. 5158.
149. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Commission, Nos. 5104, 5105.
In this case the alleged denial of appellant's application has been without
hearing.
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orderly method of obtaining evidence thereon would seem to be to
remand the case to the Commission with appropriate instructions.
In fact, in all cases, instead of the Court's undertaking to hear
additional evidence or appointing a commissioner for the purpose,
the taking of the evidence might well be referred to the Commission,
which is in a better position to accomplish the mission expeditiously,
to gauge the weight to be given to technical evidence, to supply
the assistance of its records and its engineering division, and to
accommodate itself to the convenience of the parties.
Consolidation of Cases. Frequently two or more appeals will
arise from the same or from related decisions of the Commission.
It has regularly been the practice of the Court of Appeals to permit
such cases to be treated as one proceeding on appeal, whether or not
any formal motion to consolidate is made or granted. This has
been true with respect to the record, Commission's statement, mo-
tions, briefs, oral argument, and final judgment. Among those cases
already decided, this was true in the General Electric Company and
the Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. cases, in neither of which was any
such motion made. The same is true of the Short Wave Appeals,
and others now pending before the Court. 5 '
Effect Given to Commission's Decision. In Technical Radio
Laboratory v. Commission,"" the Court of Appeals said, in meeting
appellant's contentions that the Commission's decision was contrary
to the evidence, and -that the evidence showed that public interest,
convenience or necessity would be served by granting appellant's
application:
"On this issue the burden is upon appellant, and this court should
sustain the Commission's findings of fact unless they are shown by the
record to be manifestly against the evidence."
150. In Journal Company v. Commission, Nos. 5095 and 5163, a motion
to consolidate was at first denied because the first appeal was nearing oral
argument. When it appeared on oral argument that the cases were closely
related, the Court postponed -urther consideration of it to the time when the
second might be heard. In WMAK Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Commission,
No. 5117, and Onandaga Company v. Commission, No. 5125, a motion by
appellant in the first case was resisted by appellant in the second, althotugh the
two decisions grew out of a single controversy. The channel on which the
two statiQns divided time was taken from them and awarded to an applicant
for a new station. The writer does not know what disposition was made'
of the motion.
151. 36 F. (2d) 111, 114.
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This rule, however, was not applied in the Great Lakes Broadcasting
Co. case, where, on the issues between WLS and WENR, there was
an exceedingly close balance in the evidence, as is demonstrated,
inter alia, by the fact that the four Commissioners who heard the
case, divided two and two in their decision. On account of the
division in the vote apparently, the Court undertook to decide the
case de novo on the evidence in the record.
Costs. In the General Electric Company case, costs were as-
sessed against the Commission by the Court of Appeals. These
costs were never paid, and costs have not been assessed against the
Commission on any of the appeals decided since then.
Section 16 is silent on the subject of costs. On appeals under
its provisions, if the Court of Appeals sits as a supervisory adminis-
trative tribunal, the Commission is not a party in the usual sense
of the word; it is an inferior tribunal of original jurisdiction. The
rule that permits assessment of costs against other commissions (as
distinguished from the assessment of costs against the United States)
where the Court sits in a judicial capacity in proceedings brought
to enforce or set aside orders of such commissions, is not, in the
writer's opinion, applicable.
a A judgment for costs, furthermore, would seem to be essentially
an exercise of a judicial function. 152
Miscellaneous Matters of Practice. Rule 32 of the Court of
Appeals provides:
"The general rules of this Court, regulating the practice thereof,
and the requirements as to the printing of records and filing of briefs,
shall apply to appeals under the act for the regulation of radio com-
munications. Such cases will be placed on the special calendar. After
the determination of the case, a copy of the opinion and judgment will
be certified to the lower tribunal, in lieu of a mandate, in the usual
course."' 58
Just prior to the opening of the October term in the fall of 1929
the Court rearranged its special docket and since then has proceeded
with dispatch to hear such cases as were ready for oral argument.
152. See Tesla Electric Co. v. Scott, 101 Fed. 524. If the court should
again assess costs against the Commission, seemingly the only way for its
power to be tested out is for the Commission to refuse to pay.
153. For an excellent and trustworthy guide to practice in the Court of
Appeals, see Burke, Notes on Practie_ etc. (2nd. ed.).
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Conclusion. The major defects in the statute seem likely to be
remedied in the near future by Congress.'" The remedying of
154. See 1930 Communications Com. Rep., Chap V, for a discussion of
bills now pending in 'Congress to amend Section 16. These bills propose to
give all interested parties equal rights to appeal and to participate in appeals,
and certain of them propose to confine the Court of Appeals to judicial func-
tions, with provision for review on certiorari by the Supreme Court.
Note on Extraordinary Remedies. This subject should properly be the
subject of a separate article, and the writer will confine this note to mention
of some of the more obvious considerations, without extended discussion.
Cases now pending before the Supreme Court of the United States
(White v. Johnson, et al., 29 F. (2d) 11.3, and U. S. v. American Bond &
Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448) on questions certified by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, involve the constitutionality of the Radio Act of 1927. In
both cases, appellants, in addition to attacking the validity of the Act, sought
to attack decisions of the Commission denying applications for renewal of
license as having been rendered without due process, not supported by any
evidence, etc. In both cases appellants had had hearings before the Com-
mission arld had failed to appeal under Sec. 16. The U. S. District Court in
Chicago held that they could not question the Commission's decisions under
such circumstances. In White v. Johnson, appellant instituted suit against
the U. S. Attorney and the members of the Commission to restrain not only
enforcement of the penal provisions of the Act but also the Commission's
"order." Since a decision denying gn application is self-executing, it would
seem that there is nothing to restrain with respect to it. The bill was, at
the outset, dismissed as against the members of the Commission, who de-
clined to enter an appearance.
Decisions of the Commission seem likely to be brought into question in
several ways other than on appeals under Sec. 16, e. g., by mandamus or
injunction directly against the members of the Commission, by injunction
against stations benefiting from decisions of the Commission rendered with-
out notice or. hearing to the party aggrieved, and, in isolated cases, perhaps
also against U. S. Attorneys to restrain enforcement of penal provisions of
Sec. 32 for violation of regulations of the Commission alleged to be invalid.
What decisions may be questioned in this manner depends not only on the
validity of Sec. 16 but also on what are found to be appealable decisions under
Sec. 16 and on whether, if a decision in a particular case is appealable, the
appeal furnishes an adequate remedy, e. g; (whether appellant has the right
to a stay order.) Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210; Glove News-
paper Co. v. Walker, 210 U. S. 356; Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm,
258 U. S. 122; Patmoiivej Co. v. Conway, 37 F. (2d) 114; TI C. Hurst %.
Federal Trade Commission, 268 Fed. 874; Snellinq v. Whitehead, 268 Fed. 712.
In Technical Radio Laboratory v. Commission, 36 F. (2d) 111, 114, the Court
of Appeals said:
"A hearing upon notice and an appeal to this Court are
allowed in case of a refusal. The validity of such a refusal
may also finally be tried upon proper issues in other forums."
The kinds of decisions which may prove to be not appealable under Sec.
16 have been sufficiently' covered in the above article, in which mention has
been made of two of the cases now pending in which suit for injunction has
been instituted: Siromberg-Carlson Telephone Mfg. Co., v. Saltzman, et at.(Sup. Ct. Dist. of C. Equity No. 51325) in which complaint is made of a
shift in frequency to one on which another station will cause interference,
without notice or hearing, and of the Commission's General Order 87; and
General Broadcasting System. Inc. v. Bridgeport Broadcasting System, Inc.,
D. C., D. of Conn., in which suit is brought against another station to restrain
it from operating 9n the channel used by plaintiff. There are two other cases
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some of the important defects in its administration will rest with
the Commission, and, it failing, with the Court of Appeals.
After all, the function exercised by the Federal Radio Com-
mission is primarily that of a licensing authority. It determines
who shall and who shall not have licenses, under the broad test of
"public interest, convenience or necessity." The United States is,
so far as the writer knows, the only country in the world in which
an extensive body of law is being built around the exercise of this
function. In most of the other important countries, radio com-
munication (including broadcasting)i is largely under the direct
ownership or control of the Government, and in such countries there
is no need or occasion for elaborate rules and a multiplicity of de-
cisions to govern the choice of a few licensees from a large body
of applicants. The American system of allowing radio communica-
pending of a similar nature. In Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. (WFBR) v.
Baltimore Broadcasting Corporation (WCBM) and Federal Radio Commis-
sion, the U. S. District Court at Baltimore issued, on May 24, 1930, an order
restraining WCBM from operating on 1210 kc. or on any frequency other
than its former channel of 1370 kc. This was followed by a similar order
against the Commission issued by the Supreme Court of the Dist. of Col.
WFBR operates on 1270 kc. and alleges that the 60 kc. separation would
cause ruinous interference. The shift had been made without notice or hear-
ing to WFBR. In many respects the facts of the case resemble Tribune Co. v.
Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station, Inc., (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill., No. B-
136864, Nov. 20, 1926, unreported, Cong. Rec. Vol. 68, pp. 216-219, Zollmann's
Cases on Air Law, p. 298), in which the separation complained of was 40 kc.
The other case pending is Don Lee (KHJ) v. Saltzman, et al. (Sup. Ct.
Dist. of C., Equity No. 51466), in which injunction is sought to restrain corn,-
mission from authorizing, KGA, Spokane, Wash., to operate on the channel(900 kc.) used by KHJ, Los Angeles. The shift was threatened without
notice or hearing to KHJ, a temporary restraining order" was issued on May
26, 1930, U. S. Daily, May 27, 1930. See Frost v. Corporation Commission,
278 U. S. 515; Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U. S. 287.Occasion for mandamus may arise if the Commission refuses to take any
action at all on an application (in which case it may presumably be required
to take action but not to render a particular kind of decision), or if, having
found that public interest, convenience or necessity, will be served by granting
an application, it refuses to issue or deliver the license or peru_it applied for.
Such situations may easily, arise as a result of stay orders issued by the
Court of Appeals. See cases cited in footnote 18 in the above article. It
does not seem. logical that in case the Commission has made such a finding
it should be considered free for an indefinite period to change its mind, or
that the rule of such cases as Wilbur v. U. S. ex rel. Kadrie, Adv: Ops. 1929-
1930, p. 433, should be considered applicable.
In a case where a decision of the Commission is appealable and an appeal
is taken and decided by the Court of Appeals adversely to appellant, may the
latter, by appropriate proceeding against the Commission, raise the questions
of law which are usually permitted to be raised in attacks upon decisions of
administrative tribunals? Under the Supreme Court's decision in the General
Electric Company case, since the Court of Appeals, like the Commission, is an
administrative tribunal, its decisions should be open to question in this man-
ner. The CQurt of Appeals seems to recognize this in the Technical Radio
Laboratory case, supra. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605.
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tion to be conducted by private enterprise seems to have demonstrated
its superiority; at any rate, it is in accord with prevailing American
institutions and traditions. Radio communication, however, has
introduced a relatively new problem into jurisprudence, which has
its roots in the inexorable scientific fact that the number of persons
who may simultaneously engage in radio communication is rigidly
limited by the laws of radio physics. There are not sufficient avail-
able facilities to permit free play and an open door to all private
enterprises that wish to enter the field. Consequently a method
has had to be devised for choosing a few out of many. This method
should meet the fundamental tests of due process of law so that
the many will have their opportunity to be heard and the few who
are chosen and invest their money will be protected. The method,
however, must not be permitted to become so complicated with
technicalities, delays and red tape as to constitute a constant burden
to the licensees engaged in the business of radio communication
or to deprive them of the sense of stability and security (condi-
tioned on good service) which they need fully as much as, and
probably more than, persons engaged in other kinds of business.
